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Merit Selection of the Ohio
Judiciary: An Analysis of
S.J.R. 6 and a Proposal
for Implementation
Owen L. Heggs*
The Ohio constitution provides for popular election of judges to the
supreme court, the courts of appeals, and the courts of common pleas.
Senate Joint Resolution Six is a proposed amendment which would convert
the state's judicialselection process to a "merit plan," under which judges
are appointed by the Governorfrom a list of candidatesrecommended by a
nominating commission. The authoranalyzes S.J.R. 6, which he supportsin
principle, and suggests amendments which would improve its operation. He
then proposes a legislative program designed to fully implement the merit
plan concept.
I'll tell you how I came to be a judge.
When I, good friends, was called to the bar
I'd an appetite fresh and hearty,
But I was, as many young barristers are,
An impecunious party ...
But soon I got tired of third class journeys,
And dinners of bread and water;
So I fell in love with a rich attorney's
Elderly, ugly daughter ...
The rich attorney, he jumped with joy,
And replied to my fond professions:
"You shall reap the reward of your pluck, my boy,
At the Bailey and Middlesex Sessions ....
The rich attorney was good as his word;
The briefs came trooping gaily,
And every day my voice was heard
At the sessions or Ancient Bailey ...
At length I became as rich as the GurneysAn incubus then I thought her,
So I threw over that rich attorney's
Elderly, ugly daughter.
For now I'm a judge!.
*

..

B.A. (1964), Howard University; J.D. (1967), Case Western Reserve University.

The author is Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs at Case
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MERIT SELECTION

INTRODUCTION

METHODS BY WHICH STATE JUDGES are selected and
THE
their tenure determined have been subjects of increasingly fierce
debate in recent years. 1 Several states have abandoned provisions in
their earliest constitutions which authorized legislative or executive
appointments to judicial offices in favor of direct election of judges .2
At the same time, a growing number of legislators, citizen's groups,
and judges have urged that popular election of judges is not only an
imperfect procedure for selecting competent jurists, but that it is also
counterproductive. 3 During the last thirty years, several states have
discarded the elective process in favor of merit selection, a procedure
by which judicial vacancies are filled through appointments.4
Although Ohio judges continue to be selected through the elective
6
process, 5 this state was one of the first to consider merit selection.
There have been several legislative proposals, none of which has been
successful, to amend the Ohio constitution to provide for merit selection of our appellate judiciary. 7 The latest legislative effort is Senate
Joint Resolution Number 6,8 which is presently pending in the Ohio
Senate. If enacted by both houses of the General Assembly, this
legislation would submit to the voters the question whether the
constitution should be amended to permit the appointment of Justices
of the Ohio Supreme Court and judges of the Ohio Courts of Appeals
by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Ohio Senate, from a
list of nominees recommended by a judicial nominating commission.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that merit selection is a
worthy concept which, if adopted, would improve the Ohio judiciary. 9
1. See section II infra.
2. E.g., Georgia (GA. CONST. art. III, § 4 (1812)), and Mississippi (Miss. CONST.
art. IV, §§ 2, 11, 16 (1832)).
3. See, e.g., A. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNrrED STATES (1914);
Winters, Selection of Judges-An HistoricalIntroduction,44 TEx. L. REv. 1081 (1966).
4. E.g., Missouri (Mo. CoNST. art. V, § 29(a)), and Kansas (KAN. CONsT. art. III,

§§ 2, 8, 9).
5. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6.
6. See text accompanying notes 50-55 infra.
7. S.J.R. 10, 110th Gen. Assem. (1973); H.J.R. 27, 108th Gen. Assem. (1968);
H.J.R. 42, 107th Gen. Assem. (1965); H.J.R. 32, 105th Gen. Assem. (1963); H.J.R. 33,
102d Gen. Assem. (1957); H.J.R. 37, 101st Gen. Assem. (1955); S.J.R. 31, 100th Gen.
Assem. (1953).
8. S.J.R. 6, 112th Gen. Assem. (1977) [hereinafter referred to as S.J.R.6] (Introduced February 2, 1977 by Senators Hall, Celebrezze, Milleson, Roberto, Cox, and

Bowen). See Appendix. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee and
hearings were held on May 18, June 14, and June 22, 1977. The committee has not yet

submitted a report to the senate.
9. In this article, the term "judge" will be used in a selective sense. There are a
number of judicial positions and functions which are of such a limited nature that they

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:628

The legislation will be analyzed and amendments proposed to improve
it. Finally, a proposal will be offered for implementing a comprehensive merit plan in this state.
I.

BRIEF HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

A.

The American Experience

The history of the methods by which state judges have been
selected in this country has been exhaustively treated elsewhere. 10 In
order to place S.J.R. 6 in perspective, however, there should be some
mention here of the major developments in the nation and in Ohio
which account for the present state of the law.
At the beginning of the republic, all of the original states provided
for judicial selection by means other than popular election."1 Some
state constitutions authorized the Governor to appoint all judges in
conjunction with the legislature or council, 12 while others provided
that judges be appointed by one or both houses of the legislature. 13
Thus, the founding fathers apparently did not countenance direct,
popular election of judicial officers; rather, they favored the English
practice of appointment, but opposed the absolute control of the crown
resulting from the fact that judges served at the pleasure of the
monarch. That pleasure was usually offended when the judiciary did
14
not support the crown.
have been excluded from the analysis and proposal that follow. The term "judge" is
herein defined to mean a person elected to a court of general jurisdiction which is not
less than that exercised by a municipal court. Thus, the supreme court, the courts of
appeals, the courts of common pleas and the municipal courts are included; county
courts, mayor's courts, and police courts are not. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1903.01-.96 (police courts), 1905.01-.37 (mayor's courts), 1907.01-.47 (county courts)
(Page 1968).
10. See E. HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES (1944), J. HURST, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950); H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA
(2d ed. 1972); A. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1914);
Winters & Allard, JudicialSelection and Tenure in the United States, in THE COURTS,
THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 146 (H. Jones ed. 1965); Laski, The Techniques of
Judicial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. REV. 529 (1926); Niles, The PopularElection of
Judges in HistoricalPerspective, 21 REC. N.Y. CITY B.A. 523 (1966); Taft, The Selection
and Tenure of Judges, 38 A.B.A. REP. 418 (1913); Winters, Selection of Judges-An
HistoricalIntroduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1966).
11. E. HAYNES, supra note 10, at 98.
12. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland. See Winters, supra note 10, at 1082 n.4.
13. Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Id. at 1082 n.3.
14. This sentiment is reflected in the Ninth Specification of the Declaration of
Independence, which includes the following indictment of the King: "He has made
Judges dependent of his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount of
payment of their salaries."

19781

MERIT SELECTION

In the early nineteenth century, a trend developed toward removing
the authority of public officials to appoint judges. 15 This development
has been attributed to the brand of populism which led to the election
of President Andrew Jackson in 1824 and ushered in the era of
Jacksonian Democracy. 16 It has also been suggested, however, that
other factors were involved. First, the decision of the Supreme Court
in Marbury v. Madison, 17 that the judiciary had constitutional authority to review legislative enactments, caused some to call for an end to
the practice of legislative selection of judges.1 8 Second, the judiciary
19
developed the image of being insensitive and hostile to the poor.
Third, public officials empowered to select judges used appointments
to the judiciary as rewards within the political spoils system and
appointments were made according to political expediency. 20 Finally,
the judiciary was perceived as lazy and ineffective because it often
took years for cases to wend their way through the courts. 21 In 1832,
Mississippi became the first state to amend its constitution to provide
for direct election of all judges. 2 2 New York followed suit fourteen
years later 23 and, thereafter, the trend toward direct election quickly
gained momentum, resulting in the widespread adoption of direct
election provisions in new as well as existing states.24
Almost as soon as the election process became entrenched, it
became the subject of criticism from lawyers and laymen alike.5 The
industrialization which followed the Civil War brought with it the rise
of powerful political parties. This development placed such political
power in the hands of party leaders that the selection of judges in effect
was made by these leaders, rather than by the free choice of the
electorate. 26 In addition, as the legal profession grew in numbers and
organization, there developed increased frustration with the elective
system among lawyers because of the limited amount of influence
15. Georgia began electing some lower court judges in 1812. See Winters, supra note
10, at 1082 n.7.
16. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945).
17. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).

18. E. HAYNES, supra note 10, at 93-95. See also Milligan, The ProposedChanges in
the Selection and Tenure of Judges in Ohio, 4 OHIO ST. L.J. 157, 158 (1938).
19. Winters, supra note 10, at 1082.
20. E. HAYNES, supra note 10, at 97.
21. Aumann, The Selection, Tenure, Retirement and Compensation of Judges in
Ohio, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 408, 409 (1931).
22. MIss. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 11, 16 (1832); see Winters, supra note 10, at 1082.

23. See Winters, supra note 10, at 1082.
24. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND

THE BAR: JUDICIAL

SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NON-PARTISAN COURT PLAN 7 (1969).
25. Winters, supra note 10, at 1083.
26. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 24, at 7.
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27
which could be exercised by the profession upon judicial selection.
Shortly after the turn of the century, such notables as Roscoe Pound
and former President William Howard Taft were calling for the abandonment of popular elections for judges. 28 The founding of the American Judicature Society in 1913 was based in part on the profession's
growing support for reform and served as a forum for advocacy against
judicial politics. 29 The reform movement culminated in the endorsement by the American Bar Association of the principle of merit
selection of judges in 193730 and the adoption, three years later, of the
first merit plan by the state of Missouri.3 1 In essence, the plan provided
that certain judges would be selected from nominees recommended to
the Governor by a nonpartisan nominating commission. 32 The members of the nominating commission were themselves appointed by the
Governor and were charged with the responsibility of reviewing the
qualifications of those persons available to fill vacancies on the
33
bench.
Since 1940, sixteen states have enacted legislation containing some
elements of the Missouri Plan, as it has become known. 34 These plans
27. Id. at 8.

28. Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction With the Administrationof Justice (1906), reprintedin 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 55 (1962). Taft's often quoted remarks were
contained in a speech delivered to the 1913 meeting of the American Bar Association.
See 38 A.B.A. REP. 418 (1918).
29. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 24, at 8.

30. 62 A.B.A. REP. 893 (1937). By this time Messrs. Laski and Kales had made their
very significant contributions to the literature on this subject. Kales is credited with the
development of the first refined proposal for combining certain features of the appointive and elective processes for the selection of judges. See A. KALES, supra note 10. In
1926, Professor Laski proposed variations on the Kales model which were incorporated
into the ABA resolution adopted eleven years later. See Laski, supra note 10.
31. MO. CONST. art. V, § 29(a). See note 56 infra. California amended its constitution in 1934 to provide for a form of merit plan. It differed from the Missouri Plan in that
it provided for a confirming rather than a nominating body and applied only to appellate
courts. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 26, cited in Winters, supra note 10, at 1085.
32. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 24, at 13.

33. Id.
34. The following states presently employ some type of merit plan for selection of
judges: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 152, 153); Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§
5-8; ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.070-.100, 22.10.090-.150, 22.15.160-.195 (1976)); Arizona
(ARIz. CONST. art. VI, §§ 12, 30, 36, 37); Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 24);
Indiana (IND. CONST. art. VII, §§ 9, 10, 11; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-7801-14 (Bums Supp.
1972)); Iowa (IowA CONST. art. V, § 3; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-46.24 (West Supp.
1977)); Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 8); Massachusetts (MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. 3,
art. I; Exec. Order No. 114 (1975); Opinion of the Justices to Council, 334 N.E.2d 604
(1975)); Missouri (Mo. CONST. art. V, §§ 29(a)-(e)); Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21);
New York (N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 22); Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 3,6,8,
9, 10); Tennessee (TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 4; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-103, 17-701-16
(Supp. 1976)); Utah (UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 3; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-1.7.1-1.7.9
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provide for the appointment of some or all judges by means other than
direct election.3 5 Other states provide for legislative or gubernatorial
appointment of judges, but candidates are not chosen from nominees
selected by a nominating commission. 36 A majority of the states,
however, still employ some form of popular election as the chief
method of selecting judges. 37 In some states, these elections are part of
the partisan political process. 38 In others, nonpartisan elections, sometimes held at times other than partisan elections, are utilized to select
(1969)); Vermont (VT. CONST. ch. I, § 3, ch. II, § 47, ch. III, § 71; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4,
§§ 3, 71, 111, 444, 571-74, 602 (Supp. 1972)); and Wyoming (Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4;
Wyo. STAT. § 5-1.1, 1.2 (Supp. 1975)).
35. For example, in Missouri judges sitting on the supreme court, court of appeals,
certain county courts and the St. Louis Courts of Criminal Correction are appointed. All
other state judges are elected. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 29(a).
36. Four states select judges by legislative appointment: Connecticut (CONN. CONST.
art. V, §§ 2, 3; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-40, 2-42 (West Supp. 1978)); Rhode Island
(R.I. CONsT. art. X, §§ 4, 5 (legislative appointment of supreme court justices); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 8-2-2, 8-8-7 (Supp. 1977) (gubernatorial appointment of superior court justices
and district court judges with advice and consent of senate)); South Carolina (S.C.
CoNsT. art. V, §§ 3, 9; S.C. CODE 99 14-3-10 (1976)); and Virginia (VA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 7).
Five states select judges by gubernatorial appointment: Delaware (DEL. CONST. art.
IV, § 3); Hawaii (HAW. CONST. art. V, § 3); Maine (ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 8; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 157 (West Supp. 1977)); and New Hampshire (N.H. CONST. pt.
2, art. 46 (recent legislative effort to create a judicial nominating commission held
unconstitutional under this Article, Opinion of the Justices, 335 A.2d 642 (1975))); and
New Jersey (N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, 1).
37. Twenty-five states elect judges to office: Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. VII, §§ 6,
17, 29, 38; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-200, 22-409, 22-703, 22-810 (1962)); California (CAL.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 8, 16, 26); Florida (FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10); Georgia (GA. CONST.
art. VI, 99 2-3103, 2-3108, 2-3202); Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. V, §§ 6, 11, 19; art. VI,
§7); Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12); Kentucky (Ky. CONST. § 99, 114, 115, 116, 129,
142); Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 4, 9, 22); Maryland (MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 14,
31, 40, 41D); Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 8, 12, 16); Minnesota (MINN. CONST.
art. VI, § 7); Mississippi (Miss. CONST. art. VI, §§ 145, 145A, 145B); Montana (MONT.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 6, 8, 12, 19, 20; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-201, 93-302, 93-401
(Supp. 1977)); Nevada (NEv. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 5, 8, 9, 18); New Mexico (N.M.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 12, 28); North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16; N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7A-10 (1969), 7A-16 (Supp. 1977), 7A-140 (1969)); North Dakota (N.D. CONST.
art. IV, §§ 91, 93); Ohio (OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2501.02
(Page Supp. 1977), 2503.02, 2503.03 (Page 1954)); Oregon (OR. CONST. art. VII §§ 2, 11;
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 252.010-252.080 (1977)); Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. V, § 13);
South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7; S.D. CODE 9§16-1-2, 16-6-3 (Supp. 1977)); Texas
(TEx. CONST. art. V, § 2, 4, 6, 7, 15, 18; TEX. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, art. 1715 (Vernon
1962), tit. 38, art. 1801, tit. 39, art. 1813 (Vernon 1964)); Washington (WASH. CONST. art.
IV, §§ 3, 5; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.04.071 (Supp. 1976), 2.08.060 (1961)); West
Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 2, 5, 10; W. VA. CODE §§ 3-1-16, 3-1-17 (1971));
Wisconsin (Wis. CONST. art. VII, §§ 2, 4, 7, 9, 14, 15).
38. E.g., Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. 7, §§ 6, 17, 29, 38; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-409,
22-703, 22-810 (1962)); and Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 13, 15; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, §§ 2, 111 (Purdon 1962)).
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judges. 39 In several states, legislatures and civic groups have recently
considered enacting or expanding the merit plan concept. 4°
B.

Judicial Selection in Ohio

Ohio history indicates that this state was in step with its predecessors in initially accepting and later rejecting the appointment process

for the judiciary.41 Prior to Ohio's admission to the Union in 1803, the
Governor and the state's three judges were appointed first by the
Congress and later by the President. 42 The Constitution of 1802 provided for appointment of all judges by joint resolution of both houses
of the General Assembly. 43 This remained the case until 1851, when
the populist spirit of Jacksonian Democracy had become entrenched in
Ohio.' The Ohio Constitution was amended that year to provide for
judicial selection by the people in partisan elections after candidates
were chosen by their respective political parties at nominating conventions. 45 Thus, sentiment went, democracy was restored to the process
46
of judicial selection because the voters had a voice in the matter.
The rise of political parties and the events surrounding the Tammany Hall scandal in New York City during the post-Civil War period
probably had much to do with the growing belief that partisan politics
ought not to play a major role in the election of judges. 47 In Ohio, this
led to the passage of the Nonpartisan Judiciary Act of 1911,48 which
required that all judges be elected in nonpartisan elections. The following year, the General Assembly enacted legislation which made possible another constitutional amendment which ended the practice of
39. E.g., Ohio (OHIO CONST. art. 4, §§ 2, 3, 6); Florida (FLA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 10,
15); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.021, 105.041, 105.051, 105.071, 105.08, 105.09 (West 1973));
and Wisconsin (Wis. CONST. art. 7, §§ 2, 4,7, 14; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 253.05 (West 1971)).
40. In New York, the legislature submitted to the voters in last fall's general election
the question of expanding merit selection to the court of appeals, the state's highest
court. The voters approved the proposed constitutional amendment. N.Y. CONST. art. 6,
§ 2 (amended Nov. 8, 1977). In Oregon, the Oregon Citizens' Conference on the Courts
recommended last year that a merit plan be adopted to replace the elective process by
which all state judges are presently elected. 61 JUD. 291-93 (1978).
41. See generally Aumann, The Selection, Tenure, Retirement and Compensation of
Judges in Ohio, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 408 (1931); Milligan, The Proposed Changes in the
Selection and Tenure of Judges in Ohio, 4 OIO ST. L.J. 157 (1938); Note, Judicial
Selection and Tenure-The Merit Plan in Ohio, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 255 (1973).
42. Milligan, supra note 41, at 159.
43. OHIO CONST. OF 1802, art. III, § 8; Aumann, supra note 41, at 408. The term of
office was seven years.
44. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra;Aumann, supra note 41, at 409-10.
45. Milligan, supra note 41, at 159.
46. Aumann, supra note 41, at 410.
47. Id. at 412. See also Note, supra note 41, at 261.
48. Presently codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.04 (Page 1972).
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nominating judicial candidates in political conventions and implemented instead direct election of judicial candidates through partisan, pri49
mary elections.
At about the same time that Pound and Taft began to criticize the
unhealthy state of judicial politics,50 a movement was born in Ohio to
repair the mistakes of populism and to return to an appointive method

of judicial selection, at least for the judgeships viewed as the most
important in the state.51 This culminated in a conference in 1934
sponsored by the Cincinnati Bar Association and the University of
Cincinnati Law School. 52 The conference crystalized and publicized
the growing support of Ohio lawyers for merit selection of judges on
53
the Ohio Supreme Court and the district courts of appeals.
The endorsement by the American Bar Association of the principle
of merit selection in 19 3 7 5 provided additional impetus for the General Assembly to act. In the following year, legislation was adopted
which submitted to the voters the question whether the constitution
should be amended to provide for the selection of supreme court
justices and judges on the courts of appeals by the Governor after
recommendation by a nominating commission. 55 The proposed amend49. Milligan, supra note 41, at 159.
50. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
51. Taft, The Selection and Tenure of Judges, 11 OHio L. REP. 277 (1914). See also
THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (1922). This is an
interesting account of a study directed by Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter for the
Cleveland Foundation. Although limited to the Cleveland area, it illustrates the growing
trend in the 1920's and 1930's toward abandoning the election of judges. The elected
judiciary was described as follows:
The local organization is not made up, in the main, of men of great intelligence
or vision, because of the abhorrence of politics felt by men of this type. Selfish
personal motives or the instinct of political self-preservation dominate the local
machine, and its nominations. . . are apt to represent payments for political
debts, or the best chance to win.
"Has he earned it and can he win?" asks
the local committee ...
Id. at 274. The authors of the study recommended the adoption of "the appointive
method [of judicial selection] with provision for a retirement election whereby a judge
runs against his own record." Id. at 276.
52. Report, The Selection and Tenure of Judges in Ohio, 8 U. CIN. L. REv. 359
(1934).
53. A poll of Ohio lawyers taken the following year by the Ohio State Bar Association indicates that a majority of its members favored appointment during good behavior
of supreme court justices and judges of the courts of appeals. The concept of retention
elections was also favored by a majority. Milligan, supra note 41, at 162-64.
54. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
55. Milligan, supra note 41, at 166-67. The nominating commission which was
proposed would have consisted of eight members: The chief justice, four lesser judges
(one representative from the court of appeals, one from the court of common pleas, one
from the probate court, and one from the municipal court), and three attorneys appoint-
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ment was defeated in the general election of 1938 by a large margin.5 6
Since this initial defeat, merit selection has been legislatively proposed
in the General Assembly on eight occasions. 57 However, these proposals have consistently failed to win approval in both houses and, as a
result, the voters have 5not
had the opportunity to reconsider the matter
8
in the last forty years.
The movement for reform in Ohio has not been entirely dormant,
however, despite the failure of the legislature to submit the question to
the electorate. In 1975, the Judiciary Committee of the Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission5 9 recommended to the Commission that a
merit selection plan be submitted to the General Assembly in conjunc6
tion with other proposed amendments affecting the state judiciary. 0
The Judiciary Committee's report was narrowly rejected by the
Commission in July, 1975 and the recommendations which were
ultimately transmitted to the General Assembly in March, 1976, did
not propose any change in the present system. 61 The proponents of
merit selection on the Commission submitted a minority report urging
the General Assembly to adopt a merit plan in any event. 62 S.J.R. 6,
which was introduced less than one year later, embodies the concepts
recommended by the Judiciary Committee of the Commission and
63
favored in the minority report.
ed by the Governor. The chief justice was to be a member during his tenure, while the
others were to serve not more than two consecutive three-year terms. Id.

56. Barkdull, Analysis of Ohio Vote on Appointed Judiciary, 22 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y
197 (1938). Two years later, Missouri became the first state to adopt merit selection when
its voters approved a similar proposal, and merit selection has since become known as
the Missouri Plan. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 29. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
57. S.J.R. 6, 112th Gen. Assem. (1977); S.J.R. 10, 110th Gen. Assem..(1973); H.J.R.
27, 108th Gen. Assem. (1968); H.J.R. 42, 107th Gen. Assem. (1965); H.J.R. 32, 105th
Gen. Assem. (1963); H.J.R. 33, 102d Gen. Assem. (1957); H.J.R. 37, 101st Gen. Assem.
(1955); S.J.R. 31, 100th Gen. Assem. (1953).
58. This legislative reluctance to approve such proposals is due in part to the normal
political inertia opposing change in the present system. See text accompanying note 84
infra. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the Ohio General Assembly has been
dominated by the Republican party to a great extent during the period under discussion.
The fact that the Ohio appellate judiciary is also heavily Republican may explain further
the lack of success of previous legislative proposals to implement a merit plan. See
Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections-NonpartisanPremises With PartisanResults, 32 OHIO
ST. L.J. 762, 774-77 (1971).
59. The Commission was created by the General Assembly during the 1969-1970
session. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 103.52 (Page 1978).
60. OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, PART 10, JUDICIARY 44 (1976).

61. Id. at 73.
62. Id.
63. S.J.R. 6 was introduced on February 2, 1977.
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In addition to the efforts of the Ohio Constitutional Revision
Commission, former Governor John Gilligan embarked upon a voluntary merit selection plan by Executive Order in 19724 applicable to all
judicial appointments made by the Governor pursuant to the Ohio
Constitution. 65 Nominating Commissions were appointed for each of
the state's eleven appellate districts and were authorized to nominate
candidates for appointment to vacant judicial posts. The Governor was
to appoint one of the nominees unless all of them were deemed
unacceptable, in which event the commissions could submit additional
nominations. This Executive Order was rescinded by the present Governor shortly after he assumed office because of its "doubtful
'66
Constitutional validity.

II. ELECTION VS.

APPoINTMwNT:

A DiP

iN THE QUAGMIRE

A growing number of states have adopted merit selection procedures for choosing some or all of their judges. There are strong
feelings against abandoning the election process, however, and the
arguments which have been advanced in support of this position have
undoubtedly delayed the movement for reform in several states including Ohio. 67 The theme of this article is that in the selection of the
judiciary the elective process is dysfunctional, and that a merit selection process is not only preferable but sorely needed. This section will
summarize the major criticisms which have been leveled against merit
selection and describe the rationale for changing the selection process
in Ohio.
A.

Major Arguments Against Merit Selection

1. Fanfarefor the Common Man
Whenever the subject of merit selection is discussed, one of the
first negative comments one is likely to encounter is that the elective
64. Exec. Order of Governor John J. Gilligan (June 14, 1972).

65. OHIO CONST. art. IV § 13. See text accompanying note 133 infra.
66. Exec. Order of Governor James A. Rhodes (Jan. 17, 1975).

67. See generally Roth, Wy I Am Against the California Merit Plan, the Missouri
Plan-Or Any Reasonable Facsimile Thereof, 42 J. ST. B. CAL. 346 (1967); Burnett,

Observations on the Direct-ElectionMethod ofJudicial Selection, 44 TEX. L. REv. 1098
(1966); Mullinax, Judicial Revision-An Argument Against the Merit Plan for Judicial
Selection and Tenure, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 21 (1973); Harding, The Case for Partisan

Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A.J. 1162 (1969); Spence, Should Judges Be Selected by Merit
Plan? No, 40 FLA. B.J. 1147 (1966); S. NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS (Sage Professional Paper in American Politics, Series No. 04-001,

1973); Golomb, Selection of the Judiciary: For Election, in JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE 74 (G. Winters ed. 1973).
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process, as poor as it might be, is preferable to any indirect method of
selection because the selectors will appoint a judiciary which is not
necessarily representative of the people who will have to abide by their
decisions.68 Close on the heels of that statement usually follows the
charge that the elective process at least insures the presence on the
bench of judges who are, by necessity, sensitive to the problems and
concerns of the average citizen. 69 Merit selection is thus viewed as an
effort to populate the judiciary with elitists who may have impressive
credentials but who are unaccountable to the public if they prove to be
70
incompetent in practice.
2.

No Proofin the Pudding
Other critics of merit selection focus upon the inability of its
proponents to provide conclusive proof that the elective process produces notably worse or less competent judges than those who attain the
bench by appointment. 71 In addition, the critics argue that the best
judges are those who not only aspire to the bench but who are also
willing to seek the job, as if that aspiration imports some judicial
72
quality which is desirable in our jurists.
Studies of merit plans currently in effect indicate that the process is
not without its pitfalls. For example, a minimal number of judges fail
to be retained once appointed; this has led some critics to charge that
merit selection is tantamount to a lifetime appointment and is not as
effective as the elective process in weeding out the unfit. 73 Since there
is no absolute means of gauging a prospective judge's performance in
advance, it is at least possible for an appointing authority to make the
same mistakes that voters do and less likely that the "club" which
appointed an unfit judge will be inclined to reverse itself at some later
date. This argument highlights one of the primary problems encountered in considering the matter of merit selection: What objective
criteria should be employed to decide who is best qualified to serve as a
judge, if the prerogatives of the electorate are to be curtailed? 74 The
suggestion is that a reduction in the number of people who control the
selection process will not eliminate the factor of human error.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Harding, supra note 67, at 1163.
Spence, supra note 67, at 1152.
Mullinax, supra note 67, at 24.
Golomb, supra note 67, at 77.
Roth, supra note 67, at 355.
Spence, supra note 67, at 1149; Burnett, supra note 67, at 1099.
Spence, supra note 67, at 1151. See text accompanying notes 85-89 infra.
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To Whom Is the Judiciary Accountable: The People or the
Politicians?
The proponents and opponents of merit selection have made the
mutual mistake of injecting into the debate the question whether judges
"make" law or merely interpret and apply the law as enacted by the
legislature. Opponents of merit selection claim that since judges make
law inasmuch as they give meaning to legislative policy, judges should
75
be accountable to the public to the same extent that legislators are.
Proponents counter that judges do not make law, at least not in the
legislative sense; therefore, the best judges are those who are above76the
political pressures which tend to diminish judicial independence.
3.

Both positions, however, beg the central question, which is
whether there is a more effective and fair manner to select the
judiciary. The debate over whether judges make law has little to do
with the role of the judiciary as the third branch of government. If that
branch has, as it obviously does, a function to perform in our government which is different from the executive and the legislative functions, then the criteria for service in that branch ought to be peculiarly
77
suited to it.
An important corollary to this argument is that appointed judges
are less independent than their elected counterparts. It has been suggested that appointing authorities such as Governors, nominating
commissions, and legislatures are likely to exercise inordinate control
over the judges they nominate, appoint, or confirm, thus rendering the
judiciary subservient to the other branches. 78 In support of this assertion, critics point to the provisions in some state statutes which empower the commission which appointed or recommended a prospective
judge to review his or her performance for purposes of rating that judge
in connection with a retention election. 79 Since, in many cases, the
Governor'makes most if not all of the appointments to such commis75. Mullinax, supra note 67, at 33-34; Harding, supra note 67, at 1163.
76. Watson, Judging the Judges, 53 JUD. 283, 284-85 (1970).
77. Spaeth, Reflections On a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUD. 10 (1976). The author
suggests an important distinction:
[There is an important difference between the legislative and executive
branches and the judicial branch. A legislator or executive may to some extent
represent special interests to whom he owes his election. To be sure, he should
not put those interests ahead of the general welfare, but no one expects him to
be impartial. A judge, however, who is not impartial is nothing. Worse, he is an
oppression; only because of her blindfold is the goddess of justice given a
sword.
Id. at 14.
78. Nagel, supra note 67, at 24; Mullinax, supra note 67, at 25.
79. Mullinax, supra note 67, at 32.
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sions, it is only natural that appointed judges would be especially
sensitive to the views of the Governor in the performance of their
duties.
4.

PoliticsNow and Forever
The most frequent, and perhaps the most persuasive argument
against merit selection, is the inevitability of political influence in the
judicial selection process. Critics argue that the very fact that selection
has to be made by some political authority permanently injects partisan
politics into the matter. 80 Therefore, they argue, the shift from an
elective process to an appointive one results only in transferring the
matter from an overtly political arena to one where the politicking is
more subtle because it is less visible to the public and thus more
"clubby" than it should be. 8'
It is also argued that the political process is not a negative but
rather a positive influence in the selection of judges. The publicity and
visibility of campaigning for public office serve to educate the electorate about the function of the judiciary and the views and backgrounds
of candidates for judicial office. 8 2 This feature of public education and
scrutiny is destroyed by an appointive system because it removes from
public view the judicial process as well as the personalities and qualifications of the candidates. In a society which relies upon the willingness of the majority to follow the law, it is critical that those involved
in the processes of articulating the law not be shielded from public
83
attention.
Finally, merit selection is opposed by political interests because
judgeships are important "political plums" within the system by
which the organized political parties reward the faithful, induce the
reluctant, and provide employment for party functionaries. 84 The loss
80. Roth, supra note 67, at 352; Harding, supra note 67, at 1163; Golomb, supra
note 67, at 76. See also Alfini, PartisanPressureson the NonpartisanPlan, 58 JUD. 216
(1974).
81. Spence, supra note 67, at 1148; Barber, supra note 58, at 788.

82. Mullinax, supra note 67, at 25.
83. Barber, supra note 58, at 767.
84. See text accompanying note 95 infra. See also H. JACOB, JUSTICE INAMERICA
114-15 (2d ed. 1972); K. VINES & H. JACOB, STUDIES IN JUDICIAL POLITICS 118-19
(Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. VIII, 1962); Gordon, Judicial Reform: A
Legislative Viewpoint, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 284, 286 (1976); Lindsay, The Selection of
Judges, 21 REC. N.Y. CITY B.A. 514 (1966). The then mayor of New York City stated:

"Trading and dealing by party leaders not only vitiates the basis for direct election of
judges, but virtually ensures that any outstanding judges who appear on the bench will
not be products of the elective system but its survivors." Lindsay, supra at 517.
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of an important part of the spoils system would hardly be greeted with
enthusiasm.
B.

An Argument for Merit Selection

Proponents and opponents of merit selection can be characterized
as soldiers in different camps looking at the same mountain from
opposite sides. Proponents speak of the lofty goals of a competent,
impartial, and depoliticized judiciary; opponents focus on the practical
difficulties inherent in any process of judicial selection and the realistic
possibility (or probability) that we will never have perfect judges or a
perfect process for choosing them. Perhaps the most which can be said
is that both positions are supportable. On balance, however, it is
submitted that merit selection is demonstrably preferable to popular
election and that the Ohio General Assembly should submit S.J.R. 6 or
comparable legislation to the voters for their approval.
1.

The Case for Competence

It is unquestionably true that many able judges have obtained their
positions through the elective process. It is also true that the debate
over merit selection persists in part because of the inability of
commentators and public officials to agree on the question of who is
best suited to judge a civil dispute or a criminal prosecution. 5 Both
proponents and opponents of merit selection have attempted to quantify the factors which appear to be most relevant to determining the
suitability of judicial candidates. 86 It is beyond the scope of this article
85. See A. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 12 (1955); Mott, Measurement of Judicial Personnel, 23 N.Y.U.L. REV. 262, 267 (1948); Rosenberg, The
Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?,44 TEX. L. REv. 1063 (1966).
86. Compare Roth, supra note 67, at 355:
All we need is a pool of men, men who want to be judges, men who are devoted
to the principles upon which this government has been founded, and upon
which it has grown great. Men who are dedicated, men of competence and
character who like their jobs. If we have such men, we don't need [judicial]
commissions. If we don't, commissions won't help.
with Niles, The ChangingPolitics of JudicialSelection: A Merit Planfor New York, 22
REC. N.Y. CiTy B.A. 242, 251 (1967):

Political leaders probably do know what judicial abilities and qualities are
essential; they presumably have the means of finding the facts about candidates; they might even be capable of making comparative judgments. But what
makes the present system inferior is that political leaders are not motivated to
use these faculties with independence and with the single purpose of finding the

best available candidates. There are many able lawyers who are not available;
members of other parties, men who do not want political obligations, men who
are unwilling to raise campaign funds or to engage in vote-getting self-promo-

tion. Approval of the organized bar is disdained by many political leaders and is
seldom influential with voters in partisan elections.
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to redefine the criteria for judicial competence. It is sufficient to note
that those who have studied the question agree that honesty, competence, and impartiality are indispensable qualities for effective judicial
service. 87 The fact that judicial candidates in the elective arena stress
their years of experience, church and family ties, and pledge firmness
with fairness 88 suggests that the public to whom these candidates
appeal would agree with the scholars. The inquiry here focuses on
whether the elective process or merit selection affords the better means
of producing the judiciary we desire.
Perhaps it must be assumed that those who aspire to serve on the
bench are honest. In any case, the scrutiny inherent in both electioneering and judicial recruiting will likely disclose evidence to the contrary.
By contrast, the competence and impartiality of judicial candidates
may be more insurable than is presently the case, in spite of the
difficulty of measuring these qualities in advance. If this is so, then a
system of judicial selection which provides reasonable assurances that
these traits will exist in our judges is to be preferred over one which
flatly does not, or leaves the matter to chance.
Whether or not judges make law, it is inescapable that the role and
importance of government in our lives has grown tremendously in the
last century. 89 This growth has fostered legal complexity; in any given
dispute or criminal trial, there are a host of competing interests and
issues which must be considered in reaching a just decision. Thus,
while we have always maintained that the judiciary should contain the
best minds and the fairest hearts, the current state of American jurispurdence demands that every possible step be taken to insure that this
objective be realized.
2.

The Dynamics of the PoliticalProcess
It is a fact that the elective process does not guarantee that either
competent or incompetent judges will be elected. It guarantees only
that vacancies on the bench will be filled by one of several candidates
for the position. Since there are few statutory standards of ability
which must be met by a judicial aspirant, 90 the elective process can be
best described as neutral.
87. See note 85 supra.
88. See, e.g., Spaeth, supra note 77, at 13.
89. Pound, Introduction to E. HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES at x
(1944).
90. In Ohio, for example, a judicial candidate need only be admitted to the bar, have
a minimum number of years of law practice (usually six), and reside within the jurisdictional area of the court to which he seeks election. See OHIO CONsT. art. V, § 1; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2501.02, 2301.01, 2701.04 (Page Supp. 1977).
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This neutrality is more justified in the executive and legislative
branches of government than in the judicial branch. The first two are
generally subject to greater public scrutiny and thus provide the electorate with a greater and more constant flow of information than the
third. Executive and legislative decisions and policies are more frequently subject to public review via the election process, and those
decisions and policies are generally more easily understood. The
judicial branch receives less public attention, affects only a small
number of people directly, and review by reelection is hampered by
contraints upon judicial campaigning 9 1 and the relatively greater length
of judicial terms. 92 Put another way, the neutrality of the elective
process is not an impediment to effective government by the executive
and legislative branches because the competence of officials in those
branches is more easily ascertainable and is subject to intense and
frequent popular review. But neutrality does impede an effective
judiciary because the judiciary is not subject to the same kind or
amount of public scrutiny that will insure that its members perform
93
adequately, however that term may be defined.
3.

The Role of the Electorate
As a result of the neutrality of the elective process, the selection of
judges is in a very real sense left to a small number of "opinion
91.

Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as adopted by the Supreme Court of

Ohio and effective since December 20, 1973 provides:
B. Campaign Conduct.
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office:
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other

than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
announce his views on disputed legal orpolitical issues; or misrepre-

sent his identity, qualifications, present position, or fact. [Emphasis
added.]
92. Local officials are generally elected to office for terms of four years, e.g., OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 733.02 (Page 1976) (mayors of cities), 733.24 (Page 1976) (mayors of
villages). County and state officials generally serve terms of four years, e.g., OHIO REV.

CODE ANN. § 305.01 (Page Supp. 1976) (county commissioners). The minimum term of
office for a trial judge is four years and most judges serve terms of six years, e.g., OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1907.051 (Page Supp. 1977) (four year term for county court judges),
1901.07 (Page Supp. 1977) (six year term for municipal court judges).

93. For example, Democratic voters in Cuyahoga County, which has the largest
population in Ohio, were confronted with the following situation in the 1976 primary
election. Twenty judges were to be selected, including 14 in the court of common pleas, 4
in the court of appeals, and 2 in the supreme court. Twelve of the incumbent judges in
these positions ran unopposed. The remaining eight judgeships were contested by a total

of forty candidates. Thus, the diligent voter in the Democratic primary was required to
review the qualifications of 52 candidates for election or reelection. SECRETARY OF
STATE, OHIO ELECTION STATIsTIcs 87, 165-67, 168 (1975-1976 ed.).
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makers." The electorate does not have sufficient knowledge of the
nuances of judicial craftsmanship to have a clear notion of judicial
competence. Lacking this expertise, it relies heavily on community
leaders, political party officials, and media policy shapers who publicly endorse and support judicial candidates. 94 Thus, a small number
of people exercise a disproportionate influence upon judicial elections.
The voters act simply to ratify the positions of the opinion makers
rather than to evaluate critically the suitability of aspirants according to
their qualifications and performance.
Opinion makers tend to be highly pragmatic. They often make
decisions on matters of interest to them with a view toward expanding
and preserving their respective spheres of influence. 95 This philosophy
tends to make them result oriented rather than goal oriented. In judicial
elections, this result orientation manifests itself when opinion makers
support the candidate who is most likely to be elected so that the
opinion maker can thereby expand or preserve his sphere of influence.
At the same time the object of goal orientation-the selection of
persons with the best minds and the fairest hearts-is often lost. As a
result, often judges are selected whose competence and independence
are less well established than their loyalties, prominence, and attractiveness to the electorate. 96 And since the elective process is neutral
with respect to the judiciary, the candidates supported by the opinion
94. See D. JACKSON, JUDGES 382 (1974); Rosenman, A Better Way to Select Judges,
45 JUD. 86, 88 (1964).
95. See C. PHILIP, P. NEJESKI, & A. PRESS, WHERE Do JUDGES COME FROM? 1-19
(1976). This is a fascinating study of the 1973 campaign for the position of Chief Judge of
New York's highest court. The political maneuvering between party leaders, candidates,
and would-be candidates clearly illustrates the dynamics involved in judicial elections.
96. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, THE COURTS 66 (1967).

One of the findings made by the task force should be addressed in detail. It was found
that even in elective jurisdictions a majority of those elected to the bench run as

incumbents, having been previously appointed by various political means. Id. This not
only indicates that the voters are often merely ratifiers of political decisions; it also
supports recent findings that even fewer minority group judges would be on the bench if

they had to run without the benefit of an incumbency resulting from a previous appointment.
A recent survey by the American Judicature Society reported that only about one
percent of the judges in America are black. All identifiable black judges were contacted
by mail and, of those who responded, over 60% reported that they had been either
appointed for a full term of office by some competent authority or elected after serving
for a period pursuant to an appointment. The Black Judge in America: A Statistical

Profile, 57 JUD. 18, 19, 25 (1973). Nevertheless, it has been asserted that blacks have the
best chance to obtain judgeships-regardless of the method of selection-in areas which
are heavily populated by black residents. See COALITION OF CONCERNED BLACK AMERICANS, A PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE MINORITY JUDICIARY IN THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, 18 How. L.J. 495, 504 (1975).
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makers are likely to be elected despite whatever shortcomings they
may have in terms of competence and impartiality.
There is no indication that the process of judicial selection by
opinion makers with ratification by the electorate will, in the future,
become any more goal oriented than it is at present. The critics of merit
selection are correct when they argue that the influence of partisan
politics can never be entirely eliminated from judicial selection. But
that is no reason not to alter the status quo. It would be preferable to
create a mechanism to insure that the factors of competence and
impartiality are incorporated into the result oriented criteria which
most often dominate the elective process.
A partnership between political feasibility and professional
superiority can best be accomplished through the adoption of a merit
plan of judicial selection which recognizes the realities of partisan
politics while adding a dimension of utilitarianism to the process. Of
course, a merit plan, like any other concept, is only as good as the
machinery created to implement it. The realities discussed above
indicate that a goal oriented plan should be visible and structured in a
representative manner which allows the electorate to retain its present
level of indirect participation. Such a plan would be more likely than
the present system to produce judges who are the most competent
persons available at any given time.
4.

Summary
In sum, the argument against merit selection withers when it is
realized that such a position advocates the retention in the electorate of
power that it does not possess. 97 Elected judges are not accountable to
the people and the value of an incumbency at the time of reelection
proves it. Nor would the appointment of judges under a suitable merit
plan produce a judiciary which is any more or less elitist than it is at
present. The alleged lack of proof that an appointive system fails to
produce measurably superior jurists is no reason to ignore its value.
Any system which imposes some minimum standards of competence
and which allows the healthy competition for judgeships to be waged
according to established rules is to be preferred to a system which has
97. Jackson summed up the present state of affairs as follows:
[V]oters are inclined to choose on the basis of unexamined impulses or slogans-law and order, permisiveness, crime in the streets-and not because of a
candidate's qualifications of temperament, ability and judgment. The electoral
choice is seldom a real choice at all;. . . judicial slates are often determined in
bipartisan arrangements that leave no room for opposition; voters merely ratify
the bosses' selections.
D. JACKSON, supra note 94, at 382.
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no standards of competence and in which the "rules" of competition
are set by the opinion makers.

III. THE OHIO
A.

PLAN

Merit Plans Generally

The basic merit plan model employed by those states which have
rejected popular election provides for gubernatorial selection of judges
from a list of candidates submitted by a nominating commission. 98 The
commissioners, some of whom are usually appointed by the Governor,
are charged with the responsibility of seeking applications from qualified individuals, reviewing the records, backgrounds, and general
fitness of all applicants and recommending from their number several
persons for the Governor's consideration.9 9 From these names, the
Governor either appoints someone or submits someone to the legislature for its approval. In the event that the Governor selects no one,
some other official, usually the chief justice, makes the appointment. 100
The procedure outlined above is most often used to select the
state's appellate judges. 10 1 However, many of the merit plan jurisdictions utilize a merit plan to fill all vacancies in the judiciary. 102 In
addition, several merit plans provide for retention elections to be held
within one or two years after appointment, in order to give the electorate the opportunity to reject any appointee whose performance has
been unsatisfactory. 103 There is no unanimity among merit plan juris98. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
99. E.g., Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, §§ 12, 30, 36, 37); and Utah (UTAH. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-7.1-7.8, 55-10-70 (1973)).
100. In Nebraska, the Governor makes the appointment without further confirmation. NEB. CONsT. art. V, § 21. In New Jersey, the Governor's appointment is subject to
the advice and consent of the Senate. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6 pt. 1. In Iowa, as in several
other states, the Governor's failure to act upon a nomination with thirty days after
receipt operates as an authorization for the chief justice to make an appointment from
the same list of nominees submitted to the chief executive. IOWA CONsT. art. V, § 15.
Delaware, Hawaii, and Maine also have judiciaries appointed by the Governor. See note
36 supra. In New Hampshire, the Governor appoints judicial officers, but appointments
are subject to confirmation by a judicial council which is elected by the voters. N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, arts. 46, 60. In a few states some or all judges are selected by the
legislature. See note 36 supra.
101. E.g., Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 8, 9) (supreme court only); Oklahoma
(OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B) (supreme court and court of criminal appeals).
102. E.g., Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.070-.100, 22.10.090-.150, 22.15.160-.195
(1976)). See note 34 supra.
103. E.g., Wyoming (Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4; Wyo. STAT. §§ 5-114.12, 5-114.13, 5114.17 (Supp. 1975) (after one year); Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 25) (after
two years).
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dictions as to the politics of the commissions themselves. In some
states, political leaders and office holders are barred from participating
as commission members, 10 4 while in other states, this prohibition does
not appear.10 5 Similarly, in some states, no commission member may
be considered for appointment to the bench until a fixed period of time
has passed after the expiration *of his term of service on the commission. 106 Some plans require that a fixed percentage of the members of
the nominating commission be admitted to the bar 10 7 and, frequently,
limitations are placed upon the number of members who may belong to
the same political party.10 8
Overall, the merit plan models in existence in the various states are
calculated to limit or negate political influence in the judicial selection
process. 109 However, these plans tend to vest a great deal of power in
the Governor, a consequence which could be as unfortunate as the ills
110
which gave rise to reform.
B.

S.JR. 6

S.J.R. 6111 contains variations on the themes reflected in other
merit plans. The following is an examination of the salient provisions
of this proposed amendment to the Ohio constitution, and their potential impact upon existing law.
1.

The Constitution

All Ohio judges are presently elected in nonpartisan general elections. 112 Candidates are named several months prior to the general
elections through partisan primary elections. 113 If S.J.R. 6 is approved
104. E.g., Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8).

105. E.g., Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21).
106. E.g., Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 3).
107. E.g., Indiana (IND. CONST. art. VII, § 9) (the judicial nominating commission
must be lawyers, by a majority of one, including the Chief Justice or his designee, who
serves as chairman).
108. E.g., Arizona (ARiz. CONST. art. 6, § 36) (not more than 3 of the 5 laymen nor
more than 2 of the 4 lawyers serving on the judicial nominating commission may belong
to the same political party).
109. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.

110. See Winters, One-Man JudicialSelection, 45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 198,200 (1962).
111. See Appendix.
112. Section 6 of Article IV provides for popular election of judges on the supreme

court, courts of appeals, and the courts of common pleas. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6.
Section 13 of that article confers upon the Governor the right to fill vacancies which

occur prior to the expiration of a judicial term. OHIO CONSr. art. IV, § 13.
113. Primary elections are held by political parties to nominate candidates for offices
to be voted for at the next succeeding general election. These elections are held on the
first Tuesday after the first Monday in June of each year. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
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by the General Assembly, the Ohio electorate will then have to approve it in order to effectuate the proposed merit plan. 114 As noted
earlier,1 15 the voters soundly defeated such a proposal nearly forty
years ago.

2.

Judges affected

If enacted and approved, S.J.R. 6 would not affect a large number
of judgeships in this state. Only the chief justice and six associate
justices of the supreme court, the thirty-eight judges of the courts of
appeals, and judges of any other courts superior to the courts of
common pleas 116 would be chosen by merit selection without further
electoral action.117 All other judges would still be selected by popular
election.

3.

Who is eligible

The bill does not impose any constitutional limitations upon the
persons to be considered for appointment, except that a candidate may
not be more than seventy years of age at the time he assumes the
office. 118 While there are other general requirements and prohibitions
contained in Ohio law,' 19 the amendment does not attempt to constitutionally define criteria for judicial fitness.
3513.01 (Page 1972). Judges are elected at the general election held on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November of each year. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.01 (Page
1972). Judicial elections are nonpartisan in the sense that the political affiliation of the
candidates may not appear on the election ballot. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.04 (Page
1972).
Candidates for public office, including judicial candidates, may avoid the primary
election process by seeking nomination by petition. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257
(Page 1972). Candidates seeking nomination to a countywide office such as the court of
common pleas must obtain the signatures of enough voters to equal one percent of the
total vote for the office of Governor in that county in the previous election. By way of
illustration, the total vote cast for the office of Governor in Cuyahoga County in 1974
was 457,600. SECRETARY OF STATE, OHIO ELECTION STATISTICS 137 (1973-1974 ed.).
Thus, an independent candidate would have had to obtain the signatures of at least 4,576
voters to be nominated by this procedure. The same statute which imposes this requirement provides that an independent candidate for statewide office must obtain the
signature of only five thousand voters. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257(A) (Page 1972).
114. OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
115. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
116. At present there are no such "other" courts in Ohio; a catch-all clause of S.J.R.
6 anticipates the creation of such courts, and provides for selection of judges on those
courts under the merit plan.
117. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 5, 11 (17th ed. 1976).
118. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(C); see Appendix at 5.
119. Candidates for the supreme court, the courts of-appeals, courts of common
pleas, and municipal courts must have been admitted to the bar and engaged in the
practice of law in this state for at least six years (including any prior judicial service in
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4.

The Judicial Nominating Commission
All recommendations for appointments to the judgeships affected
120
by the legislation are to come from judicial nominating commissons.
The proposal authorizes the legislature to fix the organizational structure and method of selection of the nominating commissions. 121 In the
event of enactment and approval, it will be necessary for the General
Assembly to pass additional legislation providing for means of selecting the selectors. There are, however, some important conditions in
S.J.R. 6 regarding the political and professional makeup of the
commissions. It is specifically provided that at least half the members
of any commission must be admitted to the practice of law in Ohio and
that not more than half of such membership may belong to the same
political party. 122 A commission member may be an incumbent office
12
holder. 3
5.

Nominees

The bill requires that a commission considering the filling of
vacancies in the courts affected submit the names of not fewer than
three nominees for appointment by the Governor. 124 No maximum
number is provided. There is nothing in the bill regarding the political
affiliations of those nominated; conceivably all of them could be
members of the Governor's political party. It is customary for the
Governor, like the President, to appoint members of his own political
party to judicial posts. 125 This may be the reason for the omission of
any provision requiring that a certain number of nominees be submitted who are affiliated with each of the major parties.
6.

Confirmation

Upon receipt of a list of nominees from the nominating commission, the Governor is required to select one of them for appointment. 126
any jurisdiction) preceding appointment or election. Candidates must reside within the
jurisdictional area of the court which they seek to serve. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2503.01, 2501.02, 2301.01, 1901.06 (Page Supp. 1977).
120. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(2), (3); see Appendix at 2.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(3); see Appendix at 2.
S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(3); see Appendix at 2.
S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(3); see Appendix at 2.
S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(2); see Appendix at 2.
See Alfini, PartisanPressureson the NonpartisanPlan, 58 JUD. 216, 220 (1974);

Scott, The Selection of FederalJudges: The Independent CommissionApproach, 8 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 173, 176-77 (1967).
126. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(2); see Appendix at 2.
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The appointment must then be confirmed by the Ohio Senate. 127 Thus,
under S.J.R. 6, the Governor becomes, in effect, a second nominating
authority because a nominee selected by the chief executive is not
entitled to assume office until the appointment is acted upon favorably
by the senate. Since the confirmation procedure could take time, the
bill authorizes the Chief Justice to appoint judges to fill vacancies
28
during the pendency of the appointment-confirmation process.
Since the bill provides that the Governor is to make an appointment
from a list of three or more candidates, it is possible for the Governor
to reject effectively all of the candidates recommended by the nominating commission simply by requesting additional names. This could
cause delays in the process and lead to "candidate shopping" by the
Governor.
7.

Other judges

As stated above, 129 the merit plan proposed by S.J.R. 6 would
affect only Ohio's highest courts. The remainder-and the majorityof our state judges would continue to be selected by popular election
even if the bill becomes law. 130 There is, however, a provision in the
legislation which would authorize the extension of the merit plan
concept to other judgeships in the jurisdictions, counties, or municipalities in which they are presently elected. 131 This "local option"
provision is designed to accommodate the significant differences between Ohio's most populous counties and those with sparse population. 132 In the former, it is possible that the large numbers of unknown
candidates and highly structured and influential political parties might
lead to voter approval of a merit plan, while in smaller counties, where
there are fewer judges, the voters might not favor the concept of merit
selection.
Finally, the bill provides that in the event the local option is not
exercised, vacancies occurring in the trial judiciary are to be filled by
the Governor in the same manner as is presently in effect. 133 That is,
127. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(2); see Appendix at 2.
128. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 13(B)(4); see Appendix at 7.
129. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
130. According to the most recent data available, there are 296 common pleas court
judgeships and 181 municipal judgeships in Ohio. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note
117, at 21, 76.
131. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(7); see Appendix at 4.
132. There was a similar provision in the constitutional amendment providing for
merit selection of Ohio appellate judges which was submitted to the voters and defeated
in 1938. This explanation was given for its inclusion during the campaign for its adoption.
Milligan, The Proposed Changes in the Selection and Tenure of Judges in Ohio, 4 OHIO
ST. L.J. 157, 165 (1938).
133. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 13(A); see Appendix at 6.
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the Governor fills the vacancy with no obligation to accept recommendations from any nominating commission; nor must he submit the
name of the appointee to the senate for confirmation.
8.

Terms of office and unexpired terms

All supreme court justices, judges of the courts of appeals, and
judges of the courts of common pleas are to serve staggered terms of
35
six years under the legislation. 134 This is identical to present law. 1 It
is in the area of unexpired terms that S.J.R. 6 departs from the existing
constitutional law. At present, the Governor fills vacancies arising in
any court by appointing a successor who serves until the next general
election; then, a candidate is elected to serve the balance of the
unexpired term. 136 S.J.R. 6 provides that vacancies in the courts
subject to the merit plan will be filled by the Governor in conjunction
with the nominating commission and the senate. 137 However, in the
event that the vacancy to be filled occurs more than eighteen months
before the end of the term of office, the nominee approved by the
senate is entitled to hold office for the remainder of the unexpired term
and full term thereafter.138 The reasoning underlying this provision is
139
unclear.
9.

Retention Elections
The bill provides that a judge appointed under the merit plan may
succeed to another term of office without limit upon the number of
terms. " The judge simply files a declaration of candidacy which sets
the retention process in motion. One effect of the filing of a declaration
of candidacy is to subject the judge to the rating system provided for in
the bill. 141 The other is to require that such judge's name be placed on
134. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, §§ 6(A)(1), 6(A)(5); see Appendix at 1, 3.
135. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6.
136. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 13. The constitution provides that in the event such an
unexpired term ends within one year following the next general election, the appointee

shall serve the remainder of the term and no election shall be held. Id.
137. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 13(B)(1); see Appendix at 6.
138. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 13(B)(I); see Appendix at 6.
139. It is probably a drafting error. The desirability of appointing a judge to a full term

in addition to an unexpired term is based upon the fact that it is difficult to assess
performance immediately following an appointment. If a substantial period of service

remains before a term expires, however, an assessment can be made. It therefore seems
reasonable to conclude that the drafters of S.J.R. 6 intended to authorize an appointment
to the remainder of an unexpired term plus a full term if there are less than eighteen

months remaining to be served. This interpretation is consistent with existing law. OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 13.
140. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(4); see Appendix at 2.

141. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4. See text accompanying notes
151-52 infra.
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the ballot at the general election immediately preceding the end of the
term. 142 In the event that fifty-five percent of those who vote on the
question of retention vote in favor, the judge is retained in office for
another full term. 143 In the event that fifty.-five percent do not respond
favorably, the office is considered vacant and shall be filled by the
appointment -confirmation procedure. 144
10.

Retirement

As noted, 145 no candidate will be eligible if he attains the age of
seventy years on or bef6re the commencement of the term he seeks by
retention election or appointment. 146 "Appointment" is defined as
"assum[ing] the office and enter[ing] upon the discharge of its
duties;" 47 thus, it is possible that the senate could delay confirmation
long enough to disqualify certain nominees.
11.

Evaluation

As stated above, 148 the filing of a declaration of candidacy by a
judge appointed under the merit plan subjects that judge to a public
evaluation. The evaluation is performed by the nominating commission which recommended the judge for appointment. 149 The only
language regarding the criteria for evaluation is that which requires the
commission to "review the record of a judge." It is further provided
that the method of review is to be determined by the implementing
legislation. 1 0 Once the evaluation is made, the commission must
determine whether the judge is "well qualified," "qualified," or "not
qualified. "151 The rating, which must be disclosed to the judge, is then
placed on the ballot along with the judge's name. There is language
which suggests that the judge is entitled to know his rating before filing
a declaration of candidacy, 152 but this is unclear in view of the requirement for implementing legislation.
142. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(4); see Appendix at 2.
143. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(4); see Appendix at 2.
144. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(4); see Appendix at 2.

145. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
146. There is, however, a provision for temporary appointment of retired judges by
the Chief Justice during periods of vacancy prior to gubernatorial appointment of a

permanent successor. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 13(B)(4); see Appendix at 7; OHIo Cotsr. art.
IV, § 6(C).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(C); see Appendix at 5.
See text accompanying note 141 supra.
S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4.
S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4.
S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4.
S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4. The troublesome language is:

"The method of review, informing the judge of his rating prior to his filing of a
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12.

Implementation

The bill provides that in the event of enactment and approval by the
voters, the merit plan would not become effective until 1980.153
Existing law would govern all judgeships until January 1 of that year.
All judges in office on that date would serve the remainder of their
terms before becoming subject to the appointment-confirmation process.l 54 Further, it is provided that beginning with the 1982 general
155
election, the rating system would be utilized in retention elections.
Finally, the implementing legislation required to effectuate the spirit of
the amendment must be enacted by July 1, 1980.156
C.

An Analysis of the Ohio Plan

S.J.R. 6 represents an attempt to reduce the impact of the political
process upon the selection of those who would serve in the most
important judicial posts in this state. It is ironic, then, that the legislation contains several obvious concessions to political reality. An examination of its major provisions leads to the conclusion that the bill is
basically sound but it has deficiencies which should be corrected by
amendment.
1.

Courts affected and unaffected

It is difficult to explain the focus of the bill upon the highest courts
in the state, though most merit plan jurisdictions have enacted legislation which similarly applies only to the highest courts. 157 The difficulty
stems from the inconsistency between the arguments in favor of merit
selection and the judicial offices involved. The argument that the
voters cannot adequately inform themselves concerning the qualifications and general suitability of candidates for judgeships 158 probably is
weakest when applied to the highest courts in the state. The candidates
for appellate and supreme court judgeships are more likely to have
declaration of candidacy to succeed himself.

. .

shall be provided by law." S.J.R. 6,

art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4. Presumably, this language provides for evaluation
prior to the seventy-five day deadline for filing a declaration of candidacy as a constitutional requirement. Failure to adhere to it could invalidate an evaluation, or at least keep
it off the ballot.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

S.J.R. 6, Schedule; see
S.J.R. 6, Schedule; see
S.J.R. 6, Schedule; see
S.J.R. 6, Schedule; see
See text accompanying

Appendix at 7.
Appendix at 7.
Appendix at 7.
Appendix at 7.
note 101 supra.

158. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
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some sort of "judicial track record" and be familiar to the public than
the persons who aspire to embark upon or continue a judicial career at
the trial court level. Thus, the bill appears to attack the problems
inherent in the elective process at the wrong end.
If enacted and approved, S.J.R. 6 will affect only a small number
of Ohio judges. Unaffected will be the state's 296 common pleas
judgeships and the 181 municipal court judgeships. 5 9 This scheme no
doubt is based upon an apprehension that the voters will not approve a
wholesale appointment system and the thought that the merit plan will
be more valuable at certain levels than at others. The point is, however, that the elimination of trial courts from inclusion in the legislation is the strongest argument against it. This is true because it is at the
trial court level that confusion reigns, politics abound, and voter
apathy is at its highest. 160 In addition, it is at the trial court level that
most law is "made," as that law actually affects litigants. Appellate
courts rarely reverse on factual issues or on issues decided at trial
within the unabused discretion of the trial court.161 The result is that
bad trial judges who reach bad decisions are often upheld on appeal
because of the nature of the appellate process. Because of this, any
improvement in the quality of appellate judges will have only minimal
impact upon the judicial process as a whole.
S.J.R. 6 should be amended to provide for the merit selection of all
Ohio judges, from municipal courts to the state supreme court. In light
of the fact that nominees to the appellate courts often rise from the trial
court level, this measure would further insure that those selected for
appellate and supreme court judgeships have entered the judiciary with
appropriate qualifications. In other words, to the extent that a merit
plan is preferable to election because it reduces the impact of partisan
politics, that objective is far more attainable if the merit plan is
employed at every level of the state's judiciary.
2.

Retention Elections

It has been observed that retention elections held in merit plan
jurisdictions are no more than a sop to the voters because it is rare for
159. See note 130 supra.

160. See note 95 supra. See generally, K.

DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS IN URBAN

(1967). The author paints a clear picture of the political web which entangles
urban trial judges.
161. It is provided by statute that the supreme court need not determine the weight of
the evidence when hearing an appeal. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.31 (Page 1954). In
addition, it is well recognized that appellate courts defer to the discretion of the trial
court and the triers of fact regarding all but the narrowest questions of law properly
preserved for appeal. See generally, 0. JUR. 2d Appellate Review, §§ 663-82, 714-18,
746, 805-26 (1953).
POLITICS
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an incumbent judge to be turned out of office, especially when there is
no opposition candidate on the ballot. 162 This criticism can be leveled
at the provisions in S.J.R. 6, particularly in view of the relatively low
percentage of favorable votes required for a judge to retain office. 163
Yet, retention elections provide an important mechanism for the electorate to express itself regarding a judge's philosophy or performance.
This argument is reinforced by the fact that there is no way to recall an
incumbent judge in Ohio. 164 The retention election serves the dual
purpose of providing indirect participation' 65 and of preserving the
visibility of the judiciary in the public's awareness. Review by reelection does not undercut the primary objective of merit selection,
which is t6 assure that those who ascend the bench are the most
competent persons available. In fact, the retention election process
would further insure that judges appointed to office remain sensitive to
the views of those who are affected by their decisions. While this
consideration is frequently cited to justify the continued election of
judges, 166 it is more appropriate to utilize the elective process for
purposes of review rather than initial selection because only then will
there be a record of performance for the voters to evaluate.

3.

The Nominating Process

The provisions for the composition of the nominating commission
and the procedures for the selection, appointment, and confirmation of
judges which are contained in S.J.R. 6 are similar to constitutional
language employed in other states which have merit plans. 167 The most
important feature of the scheme envisioned by the bill is the requirement of bipartisan nominating bodies. 168 The requirement that no more
162. Winters, The Merit PlanforJudicial Selection and Tenure-Its HistoricalDevelopment, 7 DuQ. L. REv. 61, 75-76 (1968).
163. It should be remembered that only fifty-five percent of those voting on the
question of retention must vote affirmatively for a particular judge to be entitled to serve

another term. S.J.R. 6 art. IV, § 6(A)(4); see Appendix at 2. Thus, assuming an eighty
percent vote on the retention issue, only 44 of every one hundred voters who go to the

polls need vote in favor. The eighty percent rate may be high. See Barber, OhioJudicial
Elections-Nonpartisan Premises With PartisanResults, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 762, 773
(1971).

164. It appears that there has never been a provision for recalling an incumbent judge
in Ohio. See Aumann, The Selection, Tenure, Retirement and Compensationof Judgesin
Ohio, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 408, 424-25 (1931). There is a constitutional provision which
authorizes the removal of a judge by concurrent resolution of both houses of the General
Assembly. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 17. However, it is unrealistic to view this provision as

a viable mechanism for voters to review judicial performance.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.
See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
See Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 29.
S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(3); see Appendix at 2.
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than half of the members may belong to the same political party insures
that partisan politics plays a lesser role in the selection process. The
requirement that commissioners serve staggered terms is also desirable
because, in the event that the implementing legislation authorizes the
Governor to appoint some or all of its members, there will be less
likelihood that the makeup of the commission will be drastically
altered during a particular administration.
The inclusion of laymen in the selection process is also a positive
development. 169 Some opponents of merit selection argue that laymen
are likely to be intimidated by lawyers to the point that they exercise
little influence. 70 But this problem is ameliorated where, as here, lay
members can account for one-half of the commission's membership.
In addition, lay participation increases the likelihood that the commission will be a diverse group of people who represent the ethnic and
17
racial makeup of the community. 1
The unfortunate aspect of this section of the bill is the authorization
for elected officials to serve on the commissions.17 2 This is regrettable
because the inclusion of partisans in what should be a nonpartisan
process endangers its potential effectiveness. The persons appointed to
the nominating commission should be capable of the greatest possible
objectivity in the recruitment and recommendation of nominees. Elected officials subject to the pressures of partisan politics in their own
positions are less likely than non-office holders to possess that kind of
detachment. The provision can be defended on the ground that it
makes possible the inclusion of incumbent judges on nominating
commissions. If this was the reason for the provision, it should have
been clearly stated in the bill.
A further problem with this section is that it fails to prevent the
commissions from nominating one of their own members; nor are there
any restrictions against a member seeking a judicial appointment upon
the completion of his term on the commission. The bill should be
amended to limit public officials eligible for commission service to
judges and to impose restrictions upon the eligibility of commissioners
169. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(3); see Appendix at 2.
170. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING
PROCESS 25-27, 70-85 (1974).
. 171. This is not assured, however. Ashman and Alfini found that notwithstanding lay
ir volvement, judicial nominating, commissions tend to be restricted to white, male
lawyers and businessmen. Id. at 228. This fact is a product of the process by which

commission members are selected or, in some cases, elected. There are ways, however,
to minimize or even eliminate this problem. See text accompanying note 206 infra.
172. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(3); see Appendix at 2.
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for judicial appointments until some fixed period following their
service.
Finally, the requirement of senate confirmation appears to be
desirable. It may be argued that this provision potentially defeats the
concepts which underlie merit selection because it injects political
considerations into the appointment process. 173 This potential problem
is outweighed, however, by the need for public awareness of the
selection process. The principal advantage of senate confirmation is
that it places the qualifications and background of a prospective appointee into the public arena prior to appointment. The opportunity for
public scrutiny of a prospective appointee's suitability for judicial
service is highly desirable, as has been demonstrated on the federal
level, 174 because it insures that factors which might disqualify a
nominee are known before that person ascends the bench. In addition,
the process of legislative confirmation is consistent with the objective
of joint participation by the executive and legislative branches of
government. In this way, the judiciary will not be under the exclusive
control of either of the other two branches. There should, however, be
safeguards in the implementing legislation to prevent the confirmation
process from becoming a political football. For example, there should
be a limit imposed upon the amount of time available to the senate for
confirmation; for the same reason, it would be advantageous to provide for confirmation by a simple majority vote, rather than some
greater mandate.
4.

Evaluation of Judges

Most commentators agree that the persons responsible for nominations to the judiciary should not be involved in any process by which
the performance of appointed judges is reviewed.17 In combining
these functions, 176 S.J.R. 6 exhibits two weaknesses. First, what
criteria will be used to evaluate our "independent" judiciary? Second,
to what extent is a nominating commission likely to recommend
rejection of an incumbent judge who previously received its approval,
often over other highly qualified candidates?
173. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.

174. The debates which occurred regarding former President Nixon's nominations of
G. Harold Carswell and Clement Haynesworth to the Supreme Court focused public
scrutiny on facts regarding their past judicial conduct. See L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW:
THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 43-45 (1974).

175. See, e.g., D. JACKSON, JUDGES 391 (1974); Winters, supra note 162, at 77; Note,

JudicialSelection in the States: A CriticalStudy With Proposalsfor Reform, 4 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 267, 309 (1976).

176. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4.
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The language empowering the commission to "review the record
of a judge" 177 is downright dangerous. It can be construed to mean no
more than an examination of a judge's performance in terms of the rate
of reversals or the efficiency with which a particular judge manages a
docket. But the danger is that the language implies more than this by
saying less. What of the judge who takes legitimate, if unpopular,
positions on matters of legal interpretation? Is that judge to be labeled
"unqualified" for that reason? While we would hope not, it is not
unlikely that sitting judges may not support the legislation because of
the vagueness of the bill's language on this point. In addition, judges
on the courts affected by the legislation rarely hear cases individually;
rather, appellate judges sit in panels of three and the justices of the
supreme court act on a panel of seven. Thus, other than the prose
which a particular judge or justice might select for an opinion, there
may not be much for the commission to "review."
Then there is a danger of "inbreeding." There is no good reason
for the same commission which recommended the appointment of a
judge to be the body which evaluates his performance. As will be
seen, 178 it would be relatively simple to appoint a different commission
to evaluate judicial performance. Thus, the expense and added bureaucratic burden attendant to the creation of a separate review body are
justified when one considers the problems inherent in an alternative
system in which the selectors are authorized to review their own
decisions.
5.

Local Options

It has been pointed out that S.J.R. 6 provides for a local option to
institute a merit plan for lower courts.17 9 This is probably attributable
to the differences in population density among the eighty-eight
counties in Ohio, along with the resulting differences of opinion which
are likely to exist regarding the impact such a plan would have on the
judiciary of a particular area. This is understandable, but, as already
shown, 180 it is at the trial court level that reform is needed most.
Although there is evidence that partisan politics do not play the role in
rural areas that it does in the cities, 181 there is no evidence that the
177. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4.
178. See text accompanying notes 216-21 infra.
179. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(7); see Appendix at 4. See text accompanying note 132
supra.

180. See text accompanying notes 160-61 supra.
181. See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS

OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR:
JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NON-PARTISAN COURT PLAN 254 (1969).
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elective process is any more objective, though rural voters do have a
reputation for greater independence. In addition, the absence of a large
field of candidates in a small county judicial race will not necessarily
generate significantly greater awareness of their ability or interest in
182
the outcome of the election.
Nor does the local option provision in the bill create the likelihood
that trial judges will ever be selected according to merit. As noted
earlier, 8 3 the powerful political interests in the cities are unwilling to
surrender their dominance over the judiciary. It is these same political
interests which will play a major role in the campaign to adopt merit
selection on the local level. In rural areas, there may be hostility to
merit selection because of the generally smaller field of candidates and
because of differences in general political philosophy. 8 4 The predictable result is that the Ohio Plan will become operative only at the
appellate level of our judiciary.
It can be argued that the public is much more likely to accept a
merit plan at the local level once the plan acquires a respectable track
record at the appellate and supreme court levels. The problem with this
analysis is that it is at those upper levels where the benefits of adopting
a merit plan would be least discernible. 8 5 To the extent that the judges
and justices are visible as individuals, the nature of their work will
make it very difficult to observe any sweeping changes in the quality of
justice which is dispensed by them as the result of the merit plan.
The expected hostility toward merit selection at the trial level could
be an intimation of statewide defeat of the constitutional amendment in
its entirety. If the need for judicial reform is genuine, it will not take
place as a result of this legislation because the local option provision
will probably not be widely exercised. The submission to the voters of
a comprehensive, statewide plan for merit selection in all state courts is
not only the most effective means of improving the judiciary, but also
182. See How Much Do Voters Know or Care About Judicial Candidates? 38 AM.
JUD. Soc'Y 141 (1955). The article contains a summary of the results of a 1954 New York
study which found that rural and urban voters were about equally uninformed about
judicial candidates prior to elections, the courts to which judges were elected, and the
names of the candidates for whom they had voted. The study was conducted within a ten
day period after the 1954 judicial elections and those interviewed claimed to have voted
on election day. Jackson suggests that the media now play a vital role in the election of
our judges. D. JACKSON, supra note 175, at 382. This fact may raise questions about the
current validity of a study done almost twenty-five years ago. However, there are recent
data which support the proposition that judicial elections and candidates do not enjoy

high priority in the public view. See Note, supra note 175, at 293-94.
183. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
184. See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 181, at 254.

185. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
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there are indications that such a plan would be favorably recieved,
despite the inclusion of trial level judiciary. The growing number of
states which have adopted merit selection on a statewide basis suggests
that both urban and rural voters are more amenable to the idea than
might be surmised at first glance. 186 In addition, the distrust in government spawned by Watergate has likely also produced public disdain for
the kinds of political machinery and machinations which have brought
us where we are. Thus, there may be significant voter support for a
rational plan for selecting persons whose public function is to operate
in an arena and in a manner in which politics should have no place. If
all persons who reside or do business in Ohio are subject to the same
laws, then it follows that all are entitled to equally qualified judges to
interpret and enforce those laws, without regard to where they live or
work.

IV.

A PROPOSAL

FOR LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION

Having examined the provisions of S.J.R. 6 and areas of possible
amendment, what follows is a proposal for implementing a merit plan
in Ohio. It builds upon the amendments proposed earlier and is meant
to provide a model for legislation which might be adopted by the
General Assembly in the event of enactment and approval of S.J.R. 6
or, preferably, a model for amendment of the bill itself. It would be
advantageous to amend S.J.R. 6 itself, because this would provide the
electorate with a clear picture of what is contemplated by the legislation and how it would operate if approved. 8 7
By way of an overview, the proposal is based upon certain premises. First, it is best to have all judges selected pursuant to a merit plan.
Second, it is not possible to insulate completely the matter of judicial
selection from the political process. Third, the legislative and executive branches should have equal power in the nomination and selection
process in order to minimize the influence of partisanship.' Fourth,
the participation of laymen is highly desirable in the selection of
judges, so that there should be equality of lay and legal representation
in the nominating process. Fifth, the nominating and evaluation processes should not be performed by the same group. Sixth, the recruit186. For example, the Arizona and Vermont merit plans which were adopted in 1974
reflect equally favorable responses from diverse groups in our national population. See
ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, §§ 12, 30, 36, 37; VT. CONST. Ch. 1, § 3, Ch. 2, § 47, Ch. 3, § 71. The
fact that no Northern industrial state has followed suit may be attributable more to
political machinery than to a hostile public attitude.
187. The original Ohio Plan contained provisions which outlined the selection process
and composition of the judicial council. See note 55 supra.
188. See notes 109-10 supra and accompanying text.
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ment process should take place within an atmosphere of strict confidentiality; however, the appointment and confirmation procedures
should be open to public view. Finally, there should be a professional,
full time staff to implement the merit plan and the policies and
procedures of the various nominating commissions.
A.

The Nominating Commissions
Any merit plan is only as good as the method employed to select
those who will serve on the body empowered to make recommendations to the appointing authority. 189 In Ohio, as in several other states,
that authority would be the Governor. 190 Notwithstanding the need for
senate confirmation, the Governor thus would hold great power in
determining the quality of the judiciary because he selects the names
which are to be sent to the senate. The existence of this power militates
against granting to the Governor the additional power to name the
persons who are to sit on the commissions themselves. This would
confer upon the Governor almost plenary power to choose the
judges. 19 1 While the merit system is certainly preferable to popular
election, it makes little sense to go to the extreme of allowing the
Governor to choose all of the judges in the state. Therefore, a different, more diverse body should participate in the nominating process. It
is here proposed that there be two commissions created to nominate
persons to be appointed by the Governor subject to senate confirmation. All municipal, common pleas, and intermediate appellate judges
should be appointed from nominations submitted by eleven district
commissions. Supreme court justices should be appointed from nominations made by a separate supreme court commission. Finally, all
judges should be evaluated for retention purposes by a commission on
fitness and discipline.
1.

The DistrictCommissions

A judicial nominating commission should be created for each of
the eleven appellate districts in the state.1 92 The makeup of the
189. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
190. As indicated in note 100 supra, the chief executive is the customary appointing

authority for nomination committees. E.g., Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 29.
191. See Winters, One-Man JudicialSelection, 45 JUD. 198, 199 (1962).
192. Those districts range in size from one to sixteen counties. Section 2501.01 of the
Ohio Revised Code provides that the following counties shall constitute the state's
eleven appellate districts:

First: Hamilton, Claremont, Butler, Warren, and Clinton;
Second: Preble, Darke, Shelby, Miami, Montgomery, Champaign, Clark, Greene,
Fayette, and Madison;
Third: Mercer, VanWert, Paulding, Defiance, Henry, Putman, Allen, Auglaize, Han-
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commissions should reflect the legitimate interests of the public in
achieving a competent and independent judiciary. One method of
accomplishing this objective is to provide that county officials elected
by the public should participate in the selection of commission members. In addition, there should be input from the bar regarding the
fitness and temperament of prospective nominees. 9 3 Finally, the Governor should have some input into the selection process as the state's
chief executive. 194 Thus, the district commissions here proposed
would be composed of appointees of the Governor, the president of the
state bar association, and the commissioners of the counties within
each appellate district. 195 It is further proposed that the appointees of
the Governor and the bar association should be admitted to the bar; the
appointees of public officials should be laymen. Throughout their
tenure, all appointees should reside within the appellate district which
they represent. The proposed scheme contemplates an equal number of
lawyers and nonlawyers on each of the eleven nominating commissions.
With the exception of the eighth and tenth appellate districts,
which include only one county each, 196 the remaining nine districts
cock, Hardin, Logan, Union, Seneca, Marion, Wyandot, and Crawford;
Fourth: Brown, Adams, Highland, Pickaway, Ross, Pike, Scioto, Lawrence, Gallia,
Jackson, Meigs, Vinton, Hocking, Athens, and Washington;
Fifth: Morrow, Richland, Ashland, Knox, Licking, Fairfield, Perry, Morgan, Muskingum, Guernsey, Coshocton, Holmes, Stark, Tuscarawas, and Delaware;
Sixth: Williams, Fulton, Wood, Lucas, Ottawa, Sandusky, Erie, and Huron;
Seventh: Mahoning, Columbiana, Carroll, Jefferson, Harrison, Belmont, Noble, and
Monroe;
Eighth: Cuyahoga
Ninth: Lorain, Medina, Wayne, and Summit;
Tenth: Franklin;
Eleventh: Lake, Ashtabula, Geauga, Trumbull, and Portage.
193. In several merit plan jurisdictions, the state bar either elects or appoints some
member of the judicial nominating commissions. E.g., IND. CONST. art. VII, § 9; IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-534-36 (Bums Supp. 1972) (elected bar commissioners); ALASKA
CON ST. art. IV, § 8; ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.010 (1976) (appointed bar commissioners).
194. Inasmuch as he is the officer of the state with the broadest constituency, the
Governor occupies a position analogous to that of the President, who nominates candidates to the federal judiciary subject to the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
195. One writer has suggested that the more diversity built into the nominating
process, the better it will be:
The genius of the federal [nominating] system may be its pluralism. The Justice
Department, the Senator, the ABA, special-interest groups, and the press are
all permitted a voice. And therein lies what solution there is: maximize, don't
minimize, the participants in the process. Let everyone be heard and do it as
openly as possible.
D. JACKSON, supra note 175, at 388.
196. The eighth and tenth appellate districts are comprised of Cuyahoga and Franklin
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each include from four to sixteen counties. In districts with an even
number of counties, 197 the elected county commissioners would select
one lay nominating commission member from each county, beginning
with the largest county according to population and proceeding to the
smallest. In districts with an odd number of counties, 198 the same
procedure would be followed, except that the largest county would
select two members in order to insure an even number of laymen. The
seriatum selection of members according to the size of the county is
important because of the restriction against more than half the
nominating commissioners having the same political affiliation. 199 The
freedom to appoint members of a particular political party will thus
diminish as the selections are made. That is, once one-half of the
county appointees named have the same political affiliation, the remaining counties would be obligated to select independents or members of another political party. 2°°
Concurrent with the selection of members by the various county
commissioners, the Governor would be empowered to select a number
equal to one-half of the total number of commission members to be
chosen at the county level. This will be an even number because of the
number of counties in a district being even or because of the selection
of two members by the largest county in a district with an odd number
of counties. The members selected by the Governor would be comprised of an equal number of persons from both political parties or
independents. The president of the state bar association would select a
number equal to that selected by the Governor, with the same limitations.
As noted, the appointees of the Governor and the state bar association would be lawyers. In the nine districts here under consideration,
the process outlined above would result in nominating commissions
ranging in size from eight to thirty-two members .201 For reasons to be
counties, respectively, the two most populous in the state. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2501.01 (Page Supp. 1977).

197. These districts are the second, third, sixth, seventh, and ninth appellate districts.
See note 192 supra.
198. These districts are the first, fourth, fifth, and eleventh appellate districts. See
note 192 supra.
199. See text accompanying note 109 supra. The legislation should provide that lay

commission members must be residents of the county in which they were originally
appointed during their terms of office.
200. See text accompanying notes 196-99 supra.
201. The ninth appellate district nominating commission would consist of a total of
eight members; the first and eleventh districts, twelve members; the sixth and seventh
districts, sixteen members; the second district, twenty members; and the third, fourth,
and fifth districts, thirty-two members. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
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discussed, 20 2 there should be a requirement that one of the lawyer
members serve as chairman. Once the commission members are select20 3
ed, they should draw lots for initial terms of one, two, or three years
and, upon the expiration of their respective terms, the appointing
authorities would replace them, with members serving full three year
terms, with the county commissioners selecting first, then the Governor and then the state bar association. This would insure that the proper
political balance is maintained.
With respect to the eighth and tenth appellate districts, consisting
of one county each, the legislation should provide that the respective
county commissioners would select eight representatives, with no
more than half belonging to the same party. The Governor and the
president of the state bar association would then select four appointees
each, with the same political limitations. Thus, in these districts, the
commissions would have sixteen members each. °4
The above approach recognizes that the political process cannot be
entirely eliminated from judicial selection. Indeed, there is no need to
do so if the influence of partisan politics is not allowed to operate in a
manner which dominates the selection process to the exclusion of other
significant factors. Control over partisan politics is achieved by including public officials who are responsible to the electorate in the
20 5
nominating process without making them commission members,
limiting the number of commission members from the same political
party, and insuring that lay interests will be represented equally with
those of the legal profession. Such a nominating commission would be
well-suited to seek out the broadest range of potential judges from all
202. See text accompanying note 209 infra.
203. The choice of a three year term for commission members is based upon the

belief that some frequency of turnover among commission members is desirable. Of
course, the danger exists that insufficient continuity and experience could result from
this approach, especially since judges serve terms of six years. An alternative would be

to retain the three year term and limit commission service to two consecutive terms or to
provide for one term of six years. Both alternatives would be consistent with the

philosophy that ongoing bodies should be insulated from sudden changes in government
by making terms of appointive office longer than those of the appointing authorities.
204. Again, the choice of sixteen members is based upon a balancing of the interest of
broad representation against the reality that too large a nominating commission would be
an inefficient decision-making body. The size and diversity of the populations of these

counties and the number of judges and prospective nominees to be considered on a
continuous basis might justify doubling the number of nominating commissioners. This
is not essential, however. Ashman and Alfini recommended that commissions operate in
small panels regarding particular vacancies, thus maximizing that use of members' time.
A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 170, at 228.

205. See text accompanying note 171 supra.
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segments of the community. In addition, the appointees of the public
officials would, in all probability, be representative of the racial and
ethnic makeup of the constituencies which elected them. Thus,
commissions consisting almost entirely of white, male businessmen
20 6
and corporate lawyers can be avoided with this system.
2.

The Supreme Court Nominating Commission

The commission created to select those to be nominated for the
Ohio Supreme Court should be structured according to the same
criteria used to compose the district commissions. That is, the commission members should represent a broad base of geographic, professional, lay, and political interests. Here, however, the importance of lay
input is arguably less vital than at the district level. The specialized
nature of the business of the supreme court militates in favor of
additional professional scrutiny and review of potential candidates for
appointment. Therefore, although lay representation is critical, 20 7 the
need for equality is less urgent.
The supreme court nominating commission would be comprised of
twenty-two members appointed by the county commissioners of all
eighty-eight counties,20 8 the Governor, the General Assembly, the
Ohio Supreme Court, and the state bar association. They would be
selected as follows. The chairmen of the eleven district commissions
would become members of this commission by virtue of their office.
These commission members would be lawyers. 2° 9 Once the district
commission members have been named, the political affiliations of the
chairmen can be ascertained. Then, eleven appointments would be
made in the following order: the Governor would appoint two non lawyers, one from each party unless the maximum number (eleven) of
206. Ashman and Alfini found that "the typical commissioner was 48 years of age or
older, white male and either a lawyer, a judge or a businessman. . . . If the nonpartisan
merit selection plan is to grow in both rural and urban areas, commissions will have to
approximate more closely a representative cross-section of our society." A. ASHMAN &
J. ALFINI, supra note 170, at 228.

207. Cf. Colson, Would a Lay JusticeBe Just?, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 351 (1977) (1976
proposal by the Governor of Idaho to appoint a layman to the state supreme court
favorably reviewed). The number of lawyers as well as laymen who regularly come into
contact with the justices of the supreme court is very small. Lawyers have additional
expertise here because there is a greater likelihood that their professional decisions and
advice will depend upon being informed of the court's decisions. However, as noted
earlier, the prospective appointees to the court are more likely to have some sort of
judicial "track record," a fact which militates in favor of lay input.
208. See text accompanying notes 192-95 supra.
209. See text accompanying note 202 supra. This is the reason for requiring that all
district commission chairmen be admitted to the bar.
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commission members from any one party had been reached in the
ranks of the district chairmen (this is unlikely because it would occur
only if all district chairmen belong to the same political party). Next,
the President pro tern of the Ohio Senate would select two nonlawyers
under the same political restrictions imposed upon the Governor. Next;
the Speaker of the Ohio House would appoint two nonlawyers, in
conformity with the above restrictions. Next, the Chief Justice of the
Ohio Supreme Court would select two persons admitted to the bar,
subject to political restrictions. Finally, the President of the Ohio State
Bar Association would select three lawyers, again subject to political
restrictions. The resulting body would thus consist of twenty.-two
members, no more than eleven of whom would belong to the same
political party and sixteen of whom would be lawyers. They would
then draw lots for initial terms of one, two, or three years and their
2 10
successors would be chosen as at the district level.
This commission would thus be representative of the entire state,
appropriate political and professional interests, and would include
important lay input in the selection process. On the whole, it might not
be as representative of racial, ethnic, and other interests as the district
commissions, but the number of political appointees would provide for
some diversity. In addition, since the Governor has the responsibility
of selecting a nominee from among those recommended by the
commission, subject to senate confirmation, the prospect for a representative supreme court exists at least to the same extent as at present.211
B.

Commission on Fitness and Discipline

As noted earlier, 2 12 S.J.R. 6, in its present form, provides that the
judicial nominating commission which nominated a judge for appoint210. The discussion in note 203 supra, regarding the advisability of longer terms is
equally applicable here. A potential problem is presented by the unequal terms of office
of the district chairmen on their respective district commissions and the supreme court

nominating commission when the commissions are initially organized. The solution is to
provide that the district chairmen be elected at the district level and assigned to one of
the longest terms (three to six years) before the other members draw lots. In addition, the
legislation should provide that, at the supreme court level, half the district chairmen
should serve the longest term; the other half should serve the next longest term. This
would prevent inequality of terms at the two levels while insuring that all district
chairmen do not leave the supreme court commission at the same time.
211. The supreme court is and has been made up of white males since its creation with
the exception of two black men: Justice Lloyd 0. Brown, who was appointed by
Governor John J. Gilligan for a brief period but was defeated in the 1974 general election,
and Justice Robert Duncan, who was appointed by Governor James A. Rhodes but did

not run for re-election. See note 96 supra.
212. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
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ment shall also perform the function of evaluating that judge for the
purpose of guiding the voters in the later retention election. There is no
good reason for this unworkable proposal. 213 It would be far more
desirable to create a separate body charged with the responsibility of
reviewing judicial performance and the power to take disciplinary
action in appropriate cases. There is already legislation in effect in
Ohio which authorizes the supreme court to appoint, on an ad hoc
basis, a commission of five judges to adjudicate cases of alleged
be amendjudicial incapacity or misconduct. 2 14 This legislation should
215
ed to provide for periodic judicial evaluation as well.
This third and very important commission would consist of three
divisions, one for the supreme court, one for the courts of appeals, and
a third for common pleas and municipal courts. All of its members
would be members of the bar. The reason for this is that judicial
performance and misconduct are matters about which laymen are
unlikely to be sufficiently informed to make meaningful and fair
judgments. 216 The fact that the electorate has the opportunity, in the
retention election, to express its approval or disapproval of a particular
judge provides sufficient lay input and removes the need for lay
representation on this commission.
213. This is one of the components of the merit plan concept that is most criticized by
those favoring direct election. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
214. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.11 (Page Supp. 1977). The commission is
composed of judges appointed by the supreme court from any five appellate districts

other than the district in which the respondent judge resides. Section 2701.12 enumerates
the following grounds for retirement, removal, or suspension of a judge: 1) misconduct
involving moral turpitude or a breach of judicial ethics; 2) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; 3) disbarment or suspension from the practice of law for misconduct
before election or appointment; 4) permanent mental or physical disability preventing

discharge of duty; and 5) mental or physical disability preventing discharge of duty for an
indefinite time. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.12 (Page Supp. 1977).

215. See Note, The Commission on JudicialQualifications:An Attempt to Deal with
JudicialMisconduct, 3 U. SAN. FPAN. L. REV. 244 (1969).

216. The assumption has two bases: first, lawyers, not laymen, appear before judges,
read their opinions, and if it occurs, are mistreated by judges. Laymen are only rarely
involved with judges on a continual basis. Second, to the extent that laymen are
informed about the conduct of a judge, whether the information is positive or negative, it
is likely to be in a "sensational" context, as where a particular judge granted shock

probation to a defendant in a rape case, dismissed the charges against a police officer
accused of brutality, or made some unkind remarks about a particular ethnic group in a
speech at a picnic. None of these things, if proven, should be overlooked; however,
neither should they be determinative of disciplinary action, nor the lack of it. The risk of
improperly based censure is simply much greater with laymen than with lawyers. Cf.
CALIF. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (providing for a Commission on Judicial Performance
consisting of five judges, two lawyers, and two laymen).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:628

1. Supreme Court Division
The supreme court division would consist of a panel of seven or
nine members of the bar. They would be appointed by the Governor
for six-year terms, 217 which would be staggered, and appointments
would be made without regard to political affiliation. It is less likely
that partisan politics would influence decisions made at this level. 218
Indeed, political affiliation is not a factor in any phase of the review
and disciplinary process here envisioned.
The members of this division should be distinguished members of
the Ohio bar of long standing and experience, such as retired justices
or judges, experienced lawyers, and legal educators. Their function
would be to review the performance of a justice seeking to succeed
himself or herself in office and to make a recommendation to be placed
on the ballot with the name of the candidate. In addition, this division
would be authorized to adjudicate any charges brought against a justice
and make findings of fact to the supreme court. The present legislation
provides that a judge aggrieved by the findings of the five judge
commission may appeal directly to the supreme court; 219 this would
continue to be the case under the proposed amendment.
2.

Appellate Division
The appellate division would consist of the Chief Justice and two
Associate Justices of the Ohio Supreme Court. They would serve
during their respective terms as a reviewing and disciplinary authority
for the thirty-eight appellate judges 220 in the state and would operate in
the same manner as the supreme court division. In order to prevent
prejudice to an aggrieved judge who wishes to appeal the division's
ruling to the supreme court, the legislation should provide that any
justice who voted against that judge at the initial adjudication may not
participate in the review of the findings being appealed.
217. See note 203 supra.
218. The nomination process is more susceptible to political abuse, because the

decision-making process at that level is not necessarily tied to easily ascertainable
criteria. The review process, on the other hand, is based on the record of the judge, and a
politically inspired decision by this body would be more subject to public scrutiny. The
"balancing" of political interests, which is employed at the nominating level, is unnecessary at the review level, because public scrutiny would ensure an apolitical decision-

making process.
219. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.11 (Page Supp. 1977). See note 214 supra.
220. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 11 (17th ed. 1976).
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Trial Division

3.

The trial division would be comprised of the presiding judges of
the eleven appellate districts in the state. It would be their responsibility to review the records of the 181 municipal court judges and the 296
common pleas judges 22 1 across the state. In addition, this division
would have the same disciplinary authority regarding these judges as
that exercised by the other two divisions. Because municipal judges
are elected in odd numbered years and serve six-year terms, 22 2 approximately one-third are elected every two years. Thus, approximately
sixty of these judges around the state would be reviewed by the eleven
panels of the commission on fitness and discipline in a given year.
Similarly, common pleas judges are elected in even numbered years
and serve six-year terms. 223 Thus, about fifty such judges would be
reviewed each year. This is a manageable number in each instance.
4.

Criteriafor review

The three divisions of the commission on qualifications and discipline outlined above would have two primary functions. First, they
would sanction or remove judges for cause or incapacity during a
judge's term. Second, they would review the performance of each
224
judge seeking to be retained in office at the end of his or her term.
This dual role would provide ongoing scrutiny of judicial conduct and
would be an excellent check against any complacency which might
accompany a judicial appointment. In essence, this sort of peer review
should minimize any abuse of judicial office.
The criteria which the commission should employ to determine
whether a judge should be retained in office is a more difficult matter.
Any system or policy which would diminish judicial independence
should be avoided. Still, several matters must be addressed in evaluating any judge. First, the commission should consider the quality of
decisions rendered. The only practical way of doing this would be to
examine the decisions which are reversed by a higher court because of
an improper interpretation of the law. Second, a judge's efficiency
ought to be considered. While the quantity of decisions rendered is not
the only measure of a judge's competence, it is indicative of that
judge's energy and dedication. To the extent that a judge's docket is
221.

Id. at 21, 76.

222. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.07 (Page Supp. 1977).
223. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2301.01 (Page Supp. 1977).
224. S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4. See text accompanying notes

148-52 supra.
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clogged, the administration of justice is hindered. Third, the out-ofcourt conduct of a judge should be considered. The presence or
absence of bad publicity, complaints regarding a judge's conduct, and
alleged breaches of the canons of judicial ethics should be taken into
account. The commission should not, however, become a roving
investigatory body. Its function is not analagous to that of an investigating grand jury, and where it is not presented with unfavorable
information, the commission would not be empowered to solicit such
information about a judge. Finally, the commission ought to consider
the results of polls which are customarily taken by local bar associations in connection with their endorsements. These results would be
helpful in determining the views of the practicing bar.
The commission's deliberations should be conducted in the strictest secrecy and the judge seeking to be retained should be given the
opportunity to appear personally in connection with his or her candidacy. Once a determination is made, the commission should inform the
judge of the rating which will be given. This would allow a judge the
option of not seeking retention in the face of an unfavorable rating by
the commission. Finally, instead of the ratings proposed in S.J.R. 6,2
the following should appear on the ballot, because they would be more
accurate: "Recommended for Retention by the Commission on Fitness
and Discipline," "No Recommendation by the Commission on
Fitness and Discipline," and "Not Recommended for Retention by the
226
Commission on Fitness and Discipline."
C.

The Selection Process

It is essential to the feasibility of any merit plan that it provide an
orderly, expeditious process for the nomination and final selection of
judges. There should, therefore, be a timetable written into the legislation providing for vacancies to be filled within a minimum reasonable
time after they arise. 22 7 This is to be distinguished from retention
225. The proposed ratings are "well qualified," "qualified," and "not qualified."
S.J.R. 6, art. IV, § 6(A)(8); see Appendix at 4.
226. The change is proposed on the ground that the commission's recommendation
should not be considered final. In the event the commission votes against recommending
retention, the judge affected should not be branded with the label "not qualified." The
presence or absence of qualifications regarding judicial performance can be independently ascertained by the electorate. The proposed language change results in the
commission's decision being made public without concurrently assassinating a judge's

character.
227. The standard timetable contained in merit plan legislation provides for judicial
vacancies to be filled within sixty days of their occurrence. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. §
22.05.080 (1976) (45 days); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-7806 (Bums Supp. 1972) (60 days); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 46.14 (West Supp. 1977) (60 days).
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elections, which would be held at the time of the annual general
elections for various offices.
There is no good reason for a judicial vacancy to remain unfilled
for longer than six months. 228 The following schedule would enable
the process to be completed before the end of that period in all but the
most unusual circumstances. First, the selection process would be
triggered by the receipt of notice by the Clerk of the Judiciary 229 that a
vacancy exists in a particular court. Such notice would come from the
presiding judge of the court affected, from the supreme court (in the
case of a removal for incapacity or other cause) or from the appropriate
county board of election (in the case of an insufficient margin of
approval in a retention election). The legislation should require that
such notice be transmitted within seven days of the occurrence of a
vacancy.
Upon receipt of notice of a vacancy, the clerk would notify the
chairman of the appropriate judicial nominating commission. That
commission would then have ninety days to conduct the screening,
interviewing, and deliberating processes necessary to make the required
number of recommendations to the Governor. There should be a
requirement that the commission cause notice of the vacancy and the
latest date for submission of applications to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the appellate district or, in the case of
vacancies on the supreme court, the state bar journal. In order to
prevent undue delay, the legislation should provide that the failure or
inability of the commission to make recommendations to the Governor
wihin the ninety day period would operate as an authorization for the
Governor to appoint a candidate of his or her choice for confirmation
by the senate. 0 Upon the final selection of candidates for nomination
to the Governor, the commission chairman would submit written
notice of the commission's nominees to the Governor, the clerk, the
President of the Senate, and the candidates who applied.
Within thirty days after receipt of the commission's nominations,
228. This is a substantially longer period than is typically provided in other merit plan
jurisdictions. See note 227 supra. The shorter mandatory timetables provided in other

states create the risk that the nominating commission will be hurried in its deliberations.
Given the criticism of those opposing merit selection that nominating commissions are
not blessed with insight significantly greater than that of the electorate, it seems wise to
allow ample time for the nomination to be submitted, the appointment made, and
confirmation to be considered. In many cases, however, the appointment process could
be completed in less than six months.
229. See section D infra.
230. These "bypass" provisions are customary. They insure diligence on the part of
the responsible officials. See note 100 supra.
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the Governor would be required to submit one candidate to the senate
for confirmation. His failure or inability to act within the time prescribed would operate as an authorization for the President of the
Senate to submit one of the candidates nominated by the commission
to the senate for confirmation. The senate would be required to act
upon any nomination made by the Governor within thirty legislative
days after receipt. In the event of the senate's failure or inability to so
act, the Governor's nomination would become final." l
In the event of a negative senate vote on the question of confirmation of the Governor's appointee, the Governor would have an additional fourteen days to submit another name from among those recommended by the nominating commission. Again, the failure or inability
of the Governor to comply with this requirement would empower the
senate to confirm another nominee named by the commission. Within
thirty days after receipt of a second appointment from the Governor,
the senate would be required to act or the appointment would become
final. This process would be repeated as often as necessary to confirm
a nominee to fill the vacancy. In the event that none of the commission's nominees are confirmed, the clerk would notify the commission
chairman that the vacancy continued to exist. Upon receipt of such
notice, the selection process would be repeated as outlined above.
D. Personnel
The admittedly complex procedure of selecting commission members and the mechanics of judicial selection here proposed require that
some administrative support be available to implement the proposed
legislation and to monitor continued conformance to the statutory
mandates here suggested. This could be accomplished by the creation
by the legislature of the position of Clerk of the Judiciary. The clerk
would be selected by majority vote of the Governor, the President of
the Senate, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. To minimize
politization, the term of office should be staggered with that of the
Governor; this suggests that a term of six years would be advisable.
The clerk and the clerk's staff salaries, as well as necessary operating
expenses, would be included in the budget of the supreme court. An
alternative method of funding would be to assess the counties for the
operating expenses of the clerk's office on a per capita basis. The total
amouht required to staff the clerk's office and to compensate commis231. Implementation of this provision would require amending the language in S.J.R.
6 which requires the advice and consent of the senate in all appointments. One way to
accomplish this would be to insert language requiring the senate's advice and consent

unless otherwise provided by law.

1978]

MERIT SELECTION

sion members for their service and actual expenses 232 should not be
excessive.

E.

Publicity

All matters involved in the screening of candidates and the selection process should be kept in the strictest confidence by the commissions. 233 In order to insure the confidentiality of the selection process,
the nominating commissions' proceedings would have to be exempt
from the provisions of the sunshine law. 234 The prospect of public
discussion of a lawyer's qualifications. and fitness for judicial office
would doubtless deter many suitable persons from making themselves
available for judgeships because of the potentially negative impact
upon their law practices or professional associations. Thus, the legislation should require commission members to affirm their commitment
to nondisclosure of matters coming before them in their official capacity. Breach of that commitment would certainly be a ground for the
235
removal of a member for cause.
Once the commission has made its recommendations to the Governor, however, the public's right to know comes into play. This does
232. It is probable that the overwhelming majority of commissioners would serve
without pay. The Indiana merit plan provides that commissioners receive only reimbursement for expenses incident to the performance of their duties. IND. CODE ANN. § 47814 (Bums Supp. 1972).
233. See ABA MODEL BY-LAWS FOR STATE AND LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS RESPECTING APPOINTMENT AND ELECTION OF JUDGES § 3 (1973). Section 3 deals with confidentiali-

ty and provides in part as follows:
(b) Except as herein otherwise specifically provided, the discussions at the
committee meetings pertaining to the qualifications of persons to be considered
by the committee shall be completely confidential; and no member of the
committee shall disclose to anyone not a member of the committee any action
taken by the committee or any statement made at a committee meeting pertaining to the qualifications of any person whose name has been submitted to, or
has been considered by, the committee.
234. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page 1978). Subsection (A) of the statute
provides:
(A) This section shall be liberally construed to require public officials to take
official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official business only in
open meetings, unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by law.
Arguably, the deliberations of the commissions could be considered to be within the
exception because of the language in subsection (G):
The members of a public body may hold an executive session only at a regular
or special meeting for the sole purpose of the consideration of any of the
following matters:
(1)

. . . to consider the appointment, employment, dismissal, discipline,

promotion, demotion or compensation of a public employee or official, or the
investigation of charges or complaints against a public employee [or] official. ...

235. The ABA Model By-Laws specifically provide for removal for breach of confidence. ABA MODEL BY-LAwS, supra note 233, at § 3(c).
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not mean that the names of all candidates should be publicized; only
names which are actually submitted to the Governor would be made
public. The major reason for requiring the Governor to submit a
nomination to the senate for confirmation is to use that mechanism to
make public the name of the nominee in order that there be public
scrutiny of a prospective appointee before, as well as after, the selection process. 236 In the event facts regarding the fitness of a nominee
have not been considered by a nominating commission, the public
would have the opportunity to express its sentiments to the senate prior
to a vote on the question of confirmation. 7 This would seem particularly important in Ohio, which has no provision for the recall of
incumbent judges.238
In addition, a prospective appointee cannot expect to be appointed
in a vacuum of silence. It is a high honor to be nominated by a
commission and appointed by the Governor for a judgeship and, even
in the event of a negative vote in the senate, the standing of such a
lawyer would not likely be diminished without good reason. In the
event that the senate is not in session, the Governor's announcement of
an appointment would not be final for thirty days; 239 thus, there would
still be time for public reaction to an appointee's fitness and, in the
event that disclosures are made which raise serious questions about the
appointment, the Governor would be able to withdraw it.
V.

CONCLUSION

The partisan political process is an important and valuable part of
American government. However, it has become clear that the judicial
branch of government performs a function that ought to be removed
from political dominance to the greatest extent possible. If that is true
of judicial work, it is no less true of judicial selection. We expect our
judges to disregard political considerations in the interpretation and
enforcement of our laws, but our present system of electing judges
makes that objective difficult to achieve and, more important, substi236. See text accompanying note 174 supra.
237. It would be advantageous for the Senate Judiciary Committee to hold formal
hearings on the Governor's appointment, as is done at the federal level. The appointee
should appear and an opportunity should be afforded to interested or aggrieved groups to
comment on his or her qualifications. The process should be as open as possible to
negate the claim that merit selection is a "secret" or "invisible" process. See Golomb,
Selection of the Judiciary:For Election, in JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 74, 76 (G.
Winters ed. 1973); Barber, Ohio JudicialElections-NonpartisanPremises With Partisan Results, 32 OHiO ST. L.J. 762, 767, 788 (1971). See also note 195 supra.
238. See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
239. See text accompanying notes 230-31 supra.
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tutes political criteria for professional qualifications. The result is that
our judiciary tends to be influenced-some would say dominated-by
forces which are irrelevant if not inimical to the judicial function.
The General Assembly and the Ohio electorate have the opportunity to remedy this situation through the enactment and approval of
S.J.R. 6. In its present form, however, the bill will not appreciably
improve the Ohio judiciary and may be politically defective for that
reason. Although adoption of a merit plan in Ohio will probably not be
easy-change is never greeted with open arms-the electorate is much
more likely to support an orderly and efficient method of judicial
selection, which does not readily lend itself to abuse, than the legislation now pending in the senate. This article has attempted to suggest a
means of accomplishing that objective. Ohio was among the first states
to consider a merit plan. Having failed to adopt one, perhaps we can
benefit from the years of experience in other states to implement a
selection process which takes advantage of their successes and avoids
their failures.
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Appendix
[Page 1]*
112th GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
REGULAR SESSION,
1977-1978

S.J.R. No.6
MESSRS. HALL-CELEBREZZE-MILLESON-ROBERTOCOX-BOWEN

JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing to amend section 6 and section 13 of Article IV of
the Constitution of the State of Ohio to provide an
appointive-elective system for the selection of certain
judges.
Be it resolved by the GeneralAssembly of the State of Ohio, threefifth of the members elected to each house concurring herein, that there
shall be submitted to the electors of the state in the manner prescribed
by law at a special election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first
Monday in May, 1977, a proposal to amend section 6 and section 13 of
Article'IV of the Constitution of Ohio to read as follows:
ARTICLE IV
Sec. 6. (A)(1) The chief justice and the justices of the supreme
court shall be elootod by the edocters of the state at large, for tem
.......THE JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF APriot less thPEALS, AND THE JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF COMMON
PLEAS SHALL SERVE SIX YEAR TERMS, WHICH SHALL BE
STAGGERED AND BEGIN AND END ON THE DAYS FIXED BY
LAW. THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF JUDGES OF COURTS ESTABLISHED BY LAW SHALL BE FIXED BY LAW.
[Page 2]
(2) The judges of the courts of appeals shall be el, td by the
clccters ef their rospefi-ve appellate distriets, for terms of noat less tht
six years GOVERNOR SHALL, WITH THE ADVICE AND
CONSENT OF THE SENATE, APPOINT AND FILL VACANCIES
IN THE OFFICES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
* Bracketed page numbers refer to pagination of original document-Ed.
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COURT, THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, THE
JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS, AND THE JUDGES OF
ANY OTHER COURT SUPERIOR TO THE COURTS OF
COMMON PLEAS THAT IS ESTABLISHED BY LAW, UNDER
AN APPOINTIVE-ELECTIVE SYSTEM BY APPOINTING, AND
SUBMITTING TO THE SENATE FOR CONFIRMATION, A PERSON FROM A LIST OF THREE OR MORE QUALIFIED PERSONS
ADMITTED TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THIS STATE
WHOSE NAMES HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNOR BY A JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION.
(3) THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHALL FIX BY LAW THE
NUMBER AND ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS, AND THE NUMBER, METHOD OF SELECTION, QUALIFICATIONS, COMPENSATION, EXPENSES AND
TERMS OF OFFICE OF THE MEMBERS OF EACH COMMISSION. THE MEMBERS OF A COMMISSION SHALL SERVE
STAGGERED TERMS. AT LEAST ONE-HALF OF THE MEMBERS OF A COMMISSION SHALL BE ADMITTED TO THE
PRACTICE OF LAW IN THIS STATE. NO MORE THAN ONEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF A COMMISSION SHALL BE
FROM THE SAME POLITICAL PARTY. A HOLDER OF PUBLIC
OFFICE MAY SERVE ON A JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION.
(4) NOT LESS THAN SEVENTY-FIVE DAYS PRIOR TO
THE GENERAL ELECTION NEXT PRECEDING THE EXPIRA-

[Page 3]
TION OF HIS TERM OF OFFICE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, A JUDGE OF A COURT OF
APPEALS, OR A JUDGE OF ANY OTHER COURT SUPERIOR TO
THE COURTS OF COMMON PLEAS THAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY LAW MAY FILE A DECLARATION OF CANDIDACY TO SUCCEED HIMSELF. THE QUESTION OF HIS
CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE FOR A FULL TERM SHALL BE
SUBMITTED, IN THE MANNER FIXED BY LAW, TO THE
ELECTORS AT THE GENERAL ELECTION. IF FIFTY-FIVE PER
CENT OF THE ELECTORS VOTING ON THE QUESTION VOTE
"YES," HE SHALL BE CONTINUED IN THE OFFICE FOR THE
TERM COMMENCING THE DAY AFTER HIS TERM EXPIRES.
IF FIFTY-FIVE PER CENT OF THE ELECTORS DO NOT VOTE
"YES," THERE SHALL BE A VACANCY IN THE OFFICE UPON
THE EXPIRATION OF THE TERM. THE GOVERNOR SHALL
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FILL THE VACANCY IN THE MANNER PROVIDED [sic] (A)(2)
OF THIS SECTION.
3-) (5) The judges of the courts of common pleas and the
divisions thereof, UNLESS THE ELECTORS APPROVE AN APPOINTIVE-ELECTIVE SYSTEM PURSUANT TO DIVISION
(A)(7) OF THIS SECTION, shall be elected by the electors of the
counties, districts, or, as may be provided by law, other subdivisions,
in which their respective courts are located, for terms of not less than
six years, and each judge of a court of common pleas or division
thereof shall reside during his term of office in the county, district, or
subdivision in which his court is located.
(4) Teims f ffie, of all judgs shall begin on the. days fixed iy
law, mid lawn shafl be enacted to presqibe the times mid inode of their
eleetion.
(6) THE JUDGES OF COURTS OF COMMON PLEAS AND
[Page 4]
OF COURTS ESTABLISHED BY LAW THAT ARE INFERIOR TO
THE COURTS OF APPEALS SHALL, UNLESS THE ELECTORS
APPROVE AN APPOINTIVE-ELECTIVE SYSTEM PURSUANT
TO DIVISION (A)(7) OF THIS SECTION, BE ELECTED IN THE
MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW.
(7)(a) NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISIONS OF
THIS ARTICLE, JUDGES OF ANY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OR OF ANY COURT ESTABLISHED BY LAW THAT IS INFERIOR TO THE COURTS OF APPEALS, MAY BE APPOINTED
UNDER AN APPOINTIVE-ELECTIVE SYSTEM, IF A MAJORITY
OF THE ELECTORS WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT VOTING ON THE QUESTION VOTE
AFFIRMATIVELY FOR THE APPOINTIVE-ELECTIVE SYSTEM.
THE METHOD OF SUBMISSION OF THE QUESTION SHALL BE
PROVIDED BY LAW.
(b) THE PROVISIONS OF DIVISIONS (A)(2), (3), AND (4)
OF THIS SECTION GOVERNING AN APPOINTIVE-ELECTIVE
SYSTEM FOR COURTS SUPERIOR TO THE COURTS OF
COMMON PLEAS SHALL APPLY TO THE JUDGES OF ANY
COURT ESTABLISHED BY LAW MADE SUBJECT TO THE SYSTEM BY THE ELECTORS, EXCEPT THAT THE LIST SUBMITTED BY THE JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION SHALL
CONTAIN NOT FEWER THAN TWO NAMES, AND THE DATE
OF COMMENCEMENT AND EXPIRATION OF THE TERM OF
EACH JUDGE SHALL BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
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(8) THE JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION RESPONSIBLE FOR SUBMISSION OF NOMINATIONS FOR THE OFFICE

OF THE JUDGE OF A COURT SHALL REVIEW THE RECORD
OF A JUDGE TO DETERMINE HIS QUALIFICATIONS TO BE
RETAINED AS JUDGE OF THE COURT, AND RATE
[Page 5]
HIM AS WELL QUALIFIED, QUALIFIED, OR NOT QUALIFIED

FOR RETENTION IN OFFICE. THE RATING OF THE JUDGE
SHALL APPEAR ON THE BALLOT UPON WHICH THE QUESTION OF THE JUDGE'S BEING RETAINED IN OFFICE IS SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORS. THE METHOD OF REVIEW, INFORMING THE JUDGE OF HIS RATING PRIOR TO HIS FILING
OF A DECLARATION OF CANDIDACY TO SUCCEED HIMSELF, AND SUBMISSION OF THE RATING ON THE BALLOT
SHALL BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
(B) The judges of the supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of
common pleas, and divisions thereof, and of all courts of record
established by law, shall, at stated times, receive, for their services
such compensation as may be provided by law, which shall not be
diminished during their term of office. The compensation of alljudgef
JUSTICES of the supreme court, except that of the chief justice, shall
be the same. The compensation of all judges of the courts of appeals
shall be the same. Common pleas judges and judges of divisions
thereof, and judges of all courts of record established by law shall
receive such compensation as may be, provided by law. Judges shall
receive no fees or perquisites, nor hold any other office of profit or
trust, under the authority of this state, or of the United States. All votes
for any judge, for any elective office, except a judicial office, under
the authority of this state, given by the general assembly, or the people
shall be void.
(C) No person shall be elected or appointed to any judicial office
if on or before the day when he shall assume the office and enter upon
the discharge of its duties he shall have attained the age of seventy
years. Any voluntary retired judge, or any judge who is retired under
this section, may be assigned with his consent, by the chief justice or
acting chief justice of the supreme court to
[Page 6]
active duty as a judge and while so serving shall receive the established
compensation for such office, computed upon a per diem basis, in
addition to any retirement benefits to which he may be entitled. Laws
may be passed providing retirement benefits for judges.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:628

SECTION 13. (A) In case the office of any judge, NOT SUBJECT TO AN APPOINTIVE-ELECTIVE SYSTEM PURSUANT TO
SECTION 6 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION,
shall become vacant, before the expiration of the regular term for
which he was elected, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by
the governor, until a successor is elected and has qualified; and such
successor shall be elected for the unexpired term, at the first general
election for the office which is vacant that occurs more than forty days
after the vacancy shall have occurred; provided, however, that when
the unexpired term ends within one year immediately following the
date of such general election, an election to fill such unexpired term
shall not be held and the appointment shall be for such unexpired term.
(B)(1) IF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, A JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT, A JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, A JUDGE OF A COURT ESTABLISHED BY LAW THAT
IS SUPERIOR TO THE COURTS OF COMMON PLEAS, OR A
JUDGE SERVING IN AN APPOINTIVE-ELECTIVE SYSTEM ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO DIVISION (A) OF SECTION 6 OF
ARTICLE IV OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BECOMES VACANT, THE GOVERNOR SHALL APPOINT, WITH THE ADVICE
AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, A SUCCESSOR. IF THE OFFICE BECOMES VACANT MORE THAN EIGHTEEN MONTHS
PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE TERM OF OFFICE, THE
SUCCESSOR SHALL SERVE FOR A PERIOD THAT INCLUDES
BOTH THE TIME REMAINING BEFORE
[Page 7]
THE TERM EXPIRES AND THE SUCCEEDING TERM OF OFFICE AS ESTABLISHED BY THE LAW IN EFFECT AT THE
TIME HE IS APPOINTED.
(2) A SUCCESSOR JUDGE IS ELIGIBLE TO FILE A DECLARATION OF CANDIDACY TO SUCCEED HIMSELF AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
(3) THE APPOINTMENT SHALL BE MADE FROM A LIST
OF PERSONS SUBMITTED BY A JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSION IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY SECTION 6 OF
ARTICLE IV OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND LAWS
ENACTED THEREUNDER.
(4) THE CHIEF JUSTICE OR ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT SHALL ASSIGN JUDGES TO SERVE
THE COURT IN WHICH THE VACANCY OCCURS, AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTIONS 2 AND 5 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE
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OHIO CONSTITUTION, UNTIL A SUCCESSOR APPOINTED BY
THE GOVERNOR AND CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE ASSUMES OFFICE.
SCHEDULE
The provisions of former Section 6 and Section 13 of Article IV of
the Constitution of Ohio and of law existing on the effective date of
this amendment shall continue to apply, until January 1, 1980, to the
election of, and appointments to fill vacancies in the offices of, the
chief justice or justices of the supreme court, judges of the courts of
appeals, and judges of courts superior to the courts of common pleas
established by law. This amendment does not affect the terms of
offices to which such chief justice or justices of the supreme court,
judges of the courts of appeals, or judges of courts established by law
have been elected or appointed prior to January
[Page 8]
1, 1980, and they may remain in office, unless removed for cause,
until the expiration of their respective terms of office and may file
declarations of candidacy to succeed themselves in office, in the
manner provided in Section 6 of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution,
not less than seventy-five days prior to the general election next
preceding the expiration of their term of office, without further appointment by the governor. However, on and after the general election
held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of 1982,
the ballot upon which the issue of their retention in office appears shall
include their rating by the judicial nominating commission established
for the office.
No appointment shall be made, under the provisions of this amendment, to fill a vacancy in the office of the chief justice of the supreme
court or of any justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of
appeals, or judge of a court superior to the courts of common pleas
established by law until after January 1, 1980. Assignment of judges to
serve courts in which such vacancies occur shall be made as provided
in division (B)(4) of Section 13 of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution
as adopted by this amendment.
Legislation implementing the provisions of this amendment shall
be enacted by July 1, 1980.
EFFECTIVE DATE
If adopted by a majority of the electors voting on this amendment
[sic] shall take effect January 1, 1979, and existing Section 6 and Section 13 of Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio shall be repealed from
such effective date.

